



Government of Northwest Territories  
Gouvernement des Territoires du Nord-Ouest

**Confidential**

**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**CORRECTIONS SERVICE**

**INVESTIGATION REPORT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**NORTH SLAVE CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX**

**Assault on** <sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

**INVESTIGATION REPORT**

**YELLOWKNIFE, NT**

**Investigation into allegations of an assault on**

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

**by** <sup>23(2)(h)(i)</sup> [REDACTED]

**Investigation Team:**

Sean Fowler, Corrections Service

Adrien Barrieau, Corrections Service

June 25, 2019

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## 1.0 Introduction

On May 28, 2019, 23(2)(d) was escorting 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(h)(i) from the Video Court Room, following a Territorial Video Court appearance. During the escort back to 23(2)(h)(i) cell, 23(2)(h)(i) assaulted 23(2)(d)

## 2.0 Chronology of Events

On May 28, 2019, at approximately, 1338 hours 23(2)(d) 23(2)(d) were in the High Security Area (HSA) and escorting 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(h)(i) to Territorial Video Court. Once they reached the main HSA exit door, they were required to cross the hallway to bring 23(2)(h)(i) through the door that enters into the visiting room hallway. 20(1)(k) 20(1)(k) 23(2)(d) held the door while 23(2)(d) escorted 23(2)(h)(i) across this hallway. A waiting 23(2)(h)(d) was there to continue the escort down to the video court room. At approximately, 1341 hours video court ended and 23(2)(h)(i) exited the room. 23(2)(d) can be seen using 23(2)(d) portable radio as 23(2)(h)(i) exits the room and is being escorted back by 23(2)(d)

On May 28, 2019, at approximately 1342 hours 23(2)(d) was escorting 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d) was the lone escorting officer and had just entered through the HSA door. There was no other officer during this portion of the escort. 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)  
23(2)(h)(i)  
23(2)(h)(i)  
23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

The cessation appears to coincide with 23(2)(d) verbal direction to stop. 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(d) approached the assault from the other direction of the HSA hallway.

23(2)(d) called for assistance to HSA and then reached for 23(2)(d) Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray. 23(2)(d) was, approximately seven (7) feet away 23(2)(d) discharged it

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d) then came in from

behind, kneeled down and applied handcuffs. 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)



23(2)(h)(i)

On May 28, 2019, at 1645 hours, a Critical Incident Stress Debrief occurred for all staff that were involved or responded to 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

On May 28, 2019, the following Correctional Officers were stationed to work in the High Security Area: 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

was designated as the Primary Responder, while 23(2)(d) was the Secondary Responder. 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

20(1)(k)

20(1)(k)

This left 23(2)(d) and 23(2)(d) as the two remaining HSA Officers responsible for escorting 23(2)(h)(i) 20(1)(k)

23(2)(d)

A review of 23(2)(h)(i)

COMS profile was completed. 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

A review of applicable Directives, Standing Orders, and Post Orders revealed that HSA post Orders were not adhered to 20(1)(k)

20(1)(k)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

### 3.0 Methodology of the investigation

The investigation included the following:

- Investigative interview with John Nahanni, Warden on June 5, 2019
- Investigative interview with Darrel Ouellette, Training Officer on June 6, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 6, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 7, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 7, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 7, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 10, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 10, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 11, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 11, 2019
- Investigative interview with 23(2)(d) on June 11, 2019
- Review of North Slave Correctional Complex Standing Orders
- Review Northwest Territories Department of Justice Corrections Service - Directives
- Review of NSCC May 28, 2019 Day Shift Summary
- Review of NSCC surveillance video
- Review of 23(2)(h)(i) Corrections Offender Management (COMS) Profile



On June 5, 2019, the investigating team met with NSCC Warden, Mr. John Nahanni. Mr. Nahanni informed that he was not at the NSCC when the assault occurred. He was at Corrections Headquarters and learned of the assault while he was meeting with the Director of Corrections (Blair Van Metre). <sup>23(2)(d)</sup>

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup>

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup>

Mr. Nahanni informed the investigation team that he learned that the assault occurred during an escort in which proper protocol was not being adhered to. He informed that NSCC Post Order High Security Area (Standing Order 6.01 Chapter 6) stipulates <sup>20(1)(k)</sup>

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup>

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup>

He advised that since the assault occurred, he

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup>

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup>

Mr. Nahanni informed that NSCC staff is aware that they must review, learn, and know the various Corrections Directives and Standing Orders. A system is in place whereby all new or revised Directives, Standing Orders, and Post Orders are to be signed by all staff indicating that they have been reviewed.

On June 6, 2019, the investigating team met with NSCC Training Officer, Mr. Darrel Ouellette to discuss Correctional Officer entry level training, as well as existing additional training that Correctional Officers receive. The Corrections Northern Recruit Training Program (CNRTP) came into existence in 2011 and was built on the framework that had been established in the preceding (Corrections Entry Level Training-CELT) NSCC Correctional Officer training program. The CNRTP consists of six weeks of in-class training followed by 14 days of workplace "shadowing." Arrest and Control is part of the self-defence module within the CNRTP. There does not appear to be training dedicated to escorting of inmates throughout the building, however during the self-defence portion emphasis is placed on awareness of the environment in which you will be working, distance, safe zones. Further to this,



recruits are taught to follow Directives and Standing Orders. The Situation Management Model is also a tool that exists within the CNRTP and staff is taught to follow this; a copy of this tool is located in Corrections Directive Chapter 6, Section 6.20 - Incident Management. Additional staff training was established, approximately three years ago. This refresher training covers varying aspects of the CNRTP. Initially these exercises were occurring every second Friday afternoon for two (2) hours however this was then expanded from bi-weekly to weekly.

Mr. Ouellette <sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED] <sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED] or operational requirements that prevent it from occurring each and every Friday afternoon.

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED] <sup>23(2)(h)(i)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>23(2)(h)(i)</sup> <sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED] Security Management

Standing Order 6. 20.01 Protocol for Assistance Calls-Adult Unit Staff, provision 4.5 reads: <sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED] The Deputy Warden of Operations will

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED] Further to this same Standing Order,

provision 4.10 reads: <sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>20(1)(k)</sup> [REDACTED] <sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>23(2)(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

23(2)(d)

On June 6, 2019, the investigators met with 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) arrived on the scene of the assault with 23(2)(d). They were second on  
the scene after 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

was with 23(2)(d) when they heard the call for assistance. 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

On June 10, 2019, the lead investigator met with 23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

This is the same  
information that the escorting officers provided regarding 23(2)(h)(i)  
behaviour. 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

On June 10, 2019, the lead investigator telephoned and spoke with 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)



June 11, 2019, the lead investigator spoke to

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

On June 11, 2019, the investigators met with

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

was designated the Primary Responder on May 28, 2019,

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

reported that

when 23(2)(h)(i)

was attending video court

23(2)(d)

was assisting

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

From there, 23(2)(d) returned to

the office and panned the camera to video court as

23(2)(d)

was expecting

23(2)(h)(i) back.

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)

It was at

this time that

23(2)(d)

heard yelling.

23(2)(d)

ran to

23(2)(h)(i)

cell to make sure it was open

and then heard part of an assistance call over the radio.

23(2)(d)

began running to the

scene of the assault and at this point moved towards

23(2)(h)(i)

and discharged the OC

spray. 23(2)(d) advised that

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

On June 11, 2019, the investigators met with

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)



23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(h)(i)  
23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d) 23(2)(h)(i)  
23(2)(h)(i) 23(2)(d)  
23(2)(d)

An exhaustive review of 23(2)(h)(i) COMS profile was completed.

A review of applicable Directives, Standing Orders, and Post Orders was completed.

**4.0 Findings**

On May 28, 2019, at approximately 1342 hours, NSCC [23(2)(h)(i)] was being escorted by [23(2)(d)] back to [23(2)(h)(i)] [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(h)(i)] [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)]

Policy in accordance with NSCC Post Order High Security Area (Standing Order 6.01 Chapter 6) stipulates [20(1)(k)] [20(1)(k)] [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)] which is a violation of this policy. All staff interviewed as part of this investigation advised that they are aware of the policy, [20(1)(k)] [20(1)(k)]

On May 28, 2019, the following Correctional Officers were stationed to work in the High Security Area [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)] was designated as the Primary Responder while [23(2)(d)] was the Secondary Responder. [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)] [20(1)(k)] [23(2)(d)] This left [23(2)(d)] and [23(2)(d)] as the two remaining HSA Officers responsible for escorting [23(2)(h)(i)] [20(1)(k)] [23(2)(d)] [23(2)(d)]

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

Security Management Standing Order

6. 20.01 Protocol for Assistance Calls-Adult Unit Staff, provision 4.5, which reads: 20(

20(1)(k)

20(1)(k)

The Deputy Warden of Operations will ensure

20(1)(k)

23(2)(d)

23(2) 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(d)

23(2)(d)

Corrections staff acted professionally and in compliance with Directives and Standing Orders from the beginning of the assault through completion. According to the Situation Management Model Corrections staff applied as much force as necessary to regain control of the threat and 23(2)(h)(i) was dealt with in a professional and compassionate manner. 23(2)(h)(i)

23(2)(h)(i)




23(2)(h)(i)

Corrections staff involved in the incident adhered to policy and completed the applicable incident reports prior to the cessation of their shift and attended the Critical Incident Stress debrief that management ensured was provided.

The CNRTP does not have a module or area of discussion/exercise specifically relating to escorting inmates within the confines of the Correctional Facility. However these techniques are covered during the Self-Defence and Use of Force training,

A review of applicable policy Directives, Standing Orders, and Post Orders did not produce any questions from the investigation team, nor did it identify any gaps that may have assisted in preventing the assault from occurring.

**Investigator Signatures:**



Adrien Barrieau  
Assistant Director  
Community Corrections

2019/07/16  
Date



Sean Fowler  
Regional Probation Manager  
North Slave Probation

2019/07/18  
Date