


LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
7TH COUNCIL, 46TH SESSION

TABLED DOCUMENT NO. 11-46

TABLED ON JANUARY 19, 1972



The Globe and Mail

CANADA WIDE

Wet snow

TORONTO HIGH
STAYS ON PAGE 2

35

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St... Cabinet leak: the policy for development of the North

By GEORGE BAIN
of the Globe and Mail
OTTAWA — A framework for northern development in the next decade, submitted by Northern Development Minister Jean Chrétien, was approved by Cabinet's committee on priorities and planning on Jan. 1, but has never been published.
It is not known whether it was made known to Government policy by a subsequent disclosure of the full Cabinet, but there is reason to believe so in that reflections of it are to be found in speeches of the minister in the past few months.

There was an apparent secondary criticism of it in a story in yesterday's Globe and Mail that said Paragette, chief of Calgary's consortium in which the Government is the principal partner, "has gone a step further than

most exploration companies in the far North in solving the problems of Eskimo employment." It has been a center of the "approved guidelines for federal and territorial programs for social improvement" set out in this non-public Cabinet Document 73571 says that it should be policy to consciously create in Government and industry employment opportuni-

ties for native peoples through attractive incentives, meaningful targets and, where necessary, imposed obligations."
It may be assumed that Paragette, given the Government's leading role, received some direction in formulating its hiring policy—in other words, acted under an imposed obligation.
There are two documents involved here—the first, a

confidential memorandum to Cabinet dated July 12, 1971, reporting what the priorities and planning committee did at its meeting on June 29; the second, a much longer confidential memorandum in which Mr. Chrétien set out his "framework" or planning in

detail by all departments and agencies concerned with northern development—a framework which the committee agreed should be adopted.
This latest leak of Cabinet documents is the fifth in the past six weeks—in addition to a secret Liberal Party paper that Mr. Bain revealed in his column last week. The other cabinet leaks have concerned the Gray Report on foreign investment and a Cabinet

committee agreement regarding that report, Government plans for cultural centres for Alberta, Indians and consideration of use of the War Measures Act five months before the P.L.Q. crisis.
The two documents dealing with northern affairs run to 31 pages. They state a philosophy rather than a policy, and the question that arises on reading them is why the Government chose not to make

the contents public, perhaps by way of a white paper. It is considered doing so.
The answer, perhaps, is that Mr. Chrétien whose policy statement on Indian affairs had an unfortunate reception in the end, decided that an educative approach, dropping ideas in occasional speeches, was preferable to the more dramatic way of publishing something that would be called Northern De-

velopment Policy 1971-1981—as it was within Cabinet confines—with all the attendant excitement.
Whatever the Government's reasons, the fact is that it has considered and agreed upon at least at the level of its important Committee on Priorities and Planning — a more coherent guide to the development of
CABINET — Page 2

TD# 11-46
Tabled on Jan. 19, 1972

Marked CONFIDENTIAL

By GEORGE BAIN

OTTAWA

A week ago, when a piece of Cabinet information leaked out which made an interesting footnote to history, if nothing else, Andrew Brewin (NDP, Greenwood) asked in the House of Commons:

"In light of the apparent leakage to the press of highly sensitive Cabinet documents, what action is the Government taking to tighten its regulations or otherwise prevent the repetition of such leaks?"

The Prime Minister replied: "It is a very interesting suggestion that we tighten our regulations. The member knows that ministers take an oath of office and officials take an oath of secrecy. In the whole system of administration, there are tons of documents circulating all year round. . . . I cannot see how the member wants us to tighten the regulations if people are going to break the rules."

Mr. Brewin might have done better—of course, the rules governing Question Period would not have permitted it—to have defined the term "highly sensitive" as applied to Cabinet documents. They are all mighty sensitive because they are secret, and are embarrassing to the Government, as a consequence, if they leak out.

But Mr. Brewin wouldn't, as he seemed to indicate in a subsequent question, argue that all these documents are highly sensitive in the sense that the national security, or anything else of consequence, would be endangered if they were made public.

Mr. Trudeau's mention of those "tons of documents" that circulate all the year round said it all. There simply aren't that many secrets in Ottawa worth mentioning—or, perhaps, it should be worth not-mentioning—nevertheless all those tons of documents go their rounds bearing stamps across the top saying "This Document is the Property of the Government of Canada" and "CONFIDENTIAL."

Mr. Brewin's supplementary question was whether the Government would consider referring to the Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, or some other committee, the whole question of secrecy in Cabinet papers and "the extent to which it is necessary to change methods to prevent documents that should be kept

secret from being exposed to the public?"

The Prime Minister said, No. And he added this:

"Anyone who knows anything about government realizes that when we want to get free discussion between officials and ministers they should be able to speak their minds with the utmost frankness. There has to be some part of government operations which is conducted in secret. There is no way in which any government will get around that."

Obviously there is some part of government operations which must be conducted in secret: the question is, how big a part? There plainly is no justification for so large a part as at present—including the justification the Prime Minister sought to make. In what way would discussion between officials and ministers be inhibited if very many more government documents, now routinely marked CONFIDENTIAL, were made public? The Government's advisers do not normally sign the papers which come to Cabinet and its committees for consideration: they are brought by the Minister concerned under his own name.

In any case, in Sweden, where all but a very few papers are routinely made public, the Government does not appear to be disabled on that account.

The story on Page One today about a Northern Development Policy for the 1970s is based on two Cabinet documents, the first marked CONFIDENTIAL, not just on the first page, but on every page. The other is marked that way on only some pages.

There is not a line in either of them that should have caused them to be kept away from the public: in fact, the mystery is why the Government did not issue them with some flourish.

If it cannot quite bring itself yet to swallow the advanced doctrine that the public has a right to know to the fullest extent possible what is being done in its name, the Government might at least have considered the public relations benefit to itself which perhaps might have been wrung from publication.

John Diefenbaker proved that a Northern vision can catch the public imagination. Or, on second thought, can that have been the trouble?

Cabinet documents on North leaked

o From Page One

the North has been made public until now.

Three important points that emerge from these documents are as follows:

—The sometimes popular notion that everything else can be left to follow as it will from resource development finds no support in this philosophy. The priorities are to be, first, what are called people-nerds; second, the preservation of the natural environment; and third, development of renewable and then non-renewable resources. This means not that the first can be satisfied fully without the third, but that resource development must be harnessed to ensure that it does the native peoples good and not harm.

—There must be much greater co-ordination of effort between Government departments and agencies dealing with the North and, in this, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development must be supreme. In one of a number of references to co-ordination in the memorandum to Cabinet the Committee on Priorities and Planning says:

“The Government’s financial allocations for all programs in the North should be the subject of regular, detailed and continuous inter-departmental consultation involving all departments and agencies concerned, the Treasury Board secretariat, and the Territorial governments.”

About 30 Government departments and agencies have interest in the North.

—The Government will not hang back and leave the development of resources entirely to private initiative. For instance, one of the priorities agreed upon is that there should be programs to encourage and assist what are called strategic projects in the development of non-renewable resources “and in which joint participation by Government and private interests is generally desirable.”

Solid precedent

There is a solid precedent for this, of course, in Panarctic Oils, formed a few years ago, in which the Government joined several private companies to form an oil exploration consortium. The Government owns about 45 per cent of

ance with a national plan for developing the Territories systematically and for providing employment and other opportunities. (Growth point policy would provide some fairly strong incentives to migration from less-favored regions.)

To deal with problems of domestic control of the economy, the Government should ensure that policies or guidelines followed in other parts of Canada are adapted to the economic situation of the North. Joint ventures may be desirable for much non-renewable resource development.

And: “The native peoples should derive early and tangible benefits from economic development and be seen to benefit.”

Emphasis indicated

Another reference elsewhere indicated the emphasis: “... in further elaborating policies, strategies and programs for northern development, particular attention should be paid to... the need to phase the rate of development of resources in keeping with the rhythm of participation and adaptation of the native peoples.”

The memorandum also begins with the conscious creation in Government and industry of employment opportunities for native peoples.

Several guidelines relate to training (including on-the-job training) and to the liberalization of education and training “to produce, more rapidly, qualified native practitioners in all professions and skills, including teachers, nurses, mechanical engineers, communications technicians, management personnel, aircraft pilots and mechanics, among others.”

Others include improvement of opportunities and mechanisms for consultation between native peoples, Government and industry; maintenance of opportunities for such traditional pursuits as hunting, trapping and fishing; sensitive counselling of, for instance, would-be migrants; better communications, including live television; better records for such cultural expressions as language, arts, handicrafts and traditional pursuits.

The long memorandum sub-

mitted by Mr. Chretien (Cabinet document 10971, dated June 15) reveals in passing that the Cabinet has been working on a strategy for northern development for more than a year.

There was a Cabinet decision on Dec. 3, 1970, on national objectives in the North. Seven objectives were set down as being pursued or capable of being pursued in the 1970s. One of these—most of the others are indicated in paragraphs already quoted on Strategy for Northern Development—is to maintain Canadian sovereignty and security in the North.

Among other things, this says: “As in the past, the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty will be assured by exercising it and this includes enforcement of legislation and regulations intended to maintain ecological balance; the conduct and co-ordination of research of all kinds under federal auspices; and in general the exercise of effective control over Canada’s Arctic territories.”

“Economic sovereignty will be safeguarded through appropriate Government action to deal with problems of foreign ownership.”

Wenkens reference

Elsewhere a note is found which appears to weaken this obvious reference to the Gray Report, and, in fact, other references to the maintenance of economic control by such means, among others, as Government participation in ownership and management.

The note says: “Over-emphasis on sovereignty in relation to ownership and control of private enterprises in the North could have disturbing effects on economic development. But Government intervention must continue to ensure that resource and energy utilization is not permitted to cause unacceptable ecological and social disturbances, or to produce results which, in the longer run, will be uneconomic for Canada and the Territories.”

On Feb. 12, 1971, there was a further Cabinet decision relating to northern policy—this one, apparently, a decision that what was needed was “to develop a strategy which recognizes that the needs of the native people of the North are

more important than resource development and that the maintenance of ecological balance is essential.”

Mr. Chretien’s memorandum, which the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning studied—and endorsed—on June 29, seems to have been the response to that decision.

Cabinet decision

Meanwhile, on May 12, there was a Cabinet decision relating to new studies on the environmental effects of proposed northern pipelines. This is revealed in a section on financial considerations in northern policy—in which it is also reported that the present level of federal expenditures in two Territories, about \$175 million a year, can be expected to continue or increase, though perhaps in the way of fees, royalties and taxes on Government investments will also go up.

In any case, there is expected to be an intensification of environmental research and regulatory activity by all departments and agencies concerned (which will require additional financing, as reflected in the Government’s decision on environmental studies required in connection with northern pipeline projects (Cabinet decision dated May 15, 1971)).

In the same section this appears:

“It is difficult to be precise about financing for strategic development projects since the significant financial details will emerge when specific proposals are being considered.”

But: “It is easy to envisage in 1981 strategic development such as major oil and gas discoveries in the Canadian Arctic, a pipeline along the Mackenzie or into James Bay, an all-Canadian rail link for the Yukon, substantially improved telecommunications using satellite technology, iron ore production in Raffin Island, a Hydro grid in the Territories, a national park 31 north of 60 degrees. Most of these imply substantial Government spending, particularly if a decision were taken at the time to make the project a joint venture with private interests.”