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DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

AN ESTIMATE OF COSTS - CREATING AND OPERATING THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT

December, 1992

C&L

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AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

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OPERATING THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT

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ᐃᓄᑦᑎᔨᑐᖅᑯᑦ

ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ –
ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖔᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᕿᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ
ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖔᓄᑐ

ᑎᓯᐱᓇ, 1992

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Core Functions	Those functions essential to operating a distinct government. Includes the legislature and its supporting functions, finance, executive council and human resource management capacity.
GNWT	Government of the Northwest Territories, prior to division.
"GNWT Study"	Financial Impact of Division of the Northwest Territories - Phase I Report - The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group for the Government of the Northwest Territories - 1991.
NIC	Nunavut Implementation Commission, created pursuant to the Political Accord.
Nunavut Political Accord	The document initialled by representatives of the Government of Canada, TFN and GNWT that sets out mutual responsibilities during the transition to April 1999, the point at which the Government of Nunavut becomes a legal entity, drafted in accordance with Article 4 of the TFN Land Claim Final Agreement.
Stakeholders	Those organizations that worked directly with the consulting team during the course of this study. 1. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2. Tungavik Federation of Nunavut 3. Government of the Northwest Territories.
TFN	Tungavik Federation of Nunavut.
Western Government	The government that will remain in the western arctic after the Government of Nunavut becomes operational.

ᖃᓄᖅ ᑐᑭᖃᕐᒪᖔᑕ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ

ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᓚᓇᖏᑦ	ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᒋᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᖑᓗ ᐊᔾᔨᐅᖏᑐᖅ ᒐᕙᒪ. ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑦ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ, ᐊᖓᔪᖃᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔾᕋᓛᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᖕᓴᓂᒃ.
ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖔ	ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖔ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ, ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ
"ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅ"	ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓄᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ - ᓯᕗᓚᕐᔪᒧᑦ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ - ᑯᐳ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓚᐃᐅᔾᔪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ - 1991.
ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐅᔪᑦ	ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐅᔪᑦ, ᑯᑭᖕᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᖕᓯᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᓇᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᒻᒥᒃ
ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᓇᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎ	ᐱᒻᒪᓇᐅᓗᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑭᒐᕐᑕᐃᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᒃ, ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᑯᑭᖕᓯᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖕᓴᒻᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᕕᓇ 1999, ᑕᕗᓇ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓ ᒐᕙᒪᖔ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍ ᓴᕿᔭᓕᕐᑎᓗ, ᑎᑎᕋᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᖕᓯᓂ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᓕᖕᒥᒃ 4 ᑕᕝᕙᓂ ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓂᖏᑕ ᑭᖑᓕᕐᐸᕐᓯᐅᑎᒻᒥ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᖓᓂ.
ᓴᕿᕐᓯᖑᔾᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ	ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᖃᓚᓇᖕᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐅᑯᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓚᐅᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ.
	1. ᐃᓄᓕᓇᔾᑐᖃᑯᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒻᒥ 2. ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ 3. ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖓᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ
ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ	ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒥ
ᐅᐊᓕᓂᐅᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖔ	ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᖔ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓕᖅᑲᕐᑎᓗ.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - NUNAVUT

The establishment of a new jurisdiction in northern Canada - a Nunavut territory with its own public government - is an event of foremost importance. In preparing for this, the federal government requires an estimate of the costs and economic benefits associated with this development. Of particular importance in this exercise are a structure for the public government, and timeframes for implementation. This study provides cost estimates on these matters.

This report is submitted to the federal government for its consideration in this important planning process. It is hoped that the information offered here will provide a good base for the determination of the overall costs and economic benefits of creating a new territory. Detailed data and planning of this kind is an essential foundation without which sound policy decision-making is not possible.

In 1990-1991 the Government of Canada provided $735.0 million to the Government of the Northwest Territories in the form of an annual grant under formula financing arrangements to assist the territorial government in meeting its responsibilities. The GNWT is responsible for undertaking a broad range of provincial-type activities for a population dispersed over an area equivalent to approximately one-third of Canada's land mass.

In October 1992 the Nunavut Political Accord was signed by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. This document provides for the establishment of a new territory with its own public government.

The creation of a public government for Nunavut will require additional expenditures in the north. These will include one-time capital expenditures to develop infrastructure in Nunavut, additional operating funds to meet the requirements of running a separate public government, and sufficient resources to address the various needs of the transition period.

The cost estimates produced are based on a transition process that concludes in 2008. This transition timing (a) increases the number of local hires in more senior positions (b) permits more local hiring and significantly reduces the incremental costs incurred during the transition process, than if a shorter transition time was used (this report presents cost estimates for 1999 and 2008). As well, this approach gives the government more time to prepare for and manage the complex transfer of responsibility for program delivery.

The transition program developed is divided into two separate components. The first is from 1992 to 1999 during which time planning for legal responsibility of service delivery is completed. In 1999, the new public government is established. From 1999 to 2008, the majority of the transfer of administrative responsibility for delivery of services occurs.

A specific organization design and process was developed. This was needed in order to estimate the cost of the public government. It will be determined, during the transition process, whether the future Government of Nunavut will actually adopt the specific organizational design that has been developed here for costing purposes. This report can be used as a working tool to make adjustments as needed.

At the present time, there are 705.5 person years that deliver regional services in the Eastern part of the Northwest Territories, the area which will become the new territory of Nunavut in 1999. Based on the design created for the headquarters of the new public government and the transition process:

- In 1992 when the transition program is initiated, 22 incremental person years are required. This grows to 289 incremental

ᓇᐃᓐᓕᒋᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ - ᓄᓇᕗᑦ

ᐊᕿᓐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᓄᑖᖕ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑭᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᒻᒥ - ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓇᒃᒥᓂᖅ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖅᑲᕐᓗᓂ - ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕆᔭᐅᓚᕆᖕᒪᕐ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕕᐅᒐᓯᐊᕐᑎᓗ, ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖅᑯᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑭᖅᓴᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᕐᑕᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕗᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᑐᒧᑦ. ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓗᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕿᓐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᒋᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᓂᐅᒃ, ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᕗᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ.

ᑖᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖅᑯᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑐᒻᒧᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᑐᒻᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᐅᑦ ᐊᕐᒋᑎᒋᔭᖓᓄᑦ. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᑐᓴᕈᑏᑦ ᑖᑯᓇᓂᑐᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᓇᐊᖅᓴᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᒋᕐᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᕿᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᑖᒥᒃ. ᐅᓂᒃᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᔪᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑯᕐᑐᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓇᖅᒪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᖏᐸᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕋᔭᕐᑐᖅ.

ᐊᕐᕌᑎᓗᒍ 1990-1991 ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖓ ᐱᑎᑎᓇᐅᕐᒪᑕ $735.0 ᒥᓕᐊᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᓯᕙᖅᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᖅᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᖅᑐᕋᐅᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᖅᑭᑎᑎᔪᓇᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᓴᒻᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕐᒋᓗᒋᑦ. ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᓴᖅᑭᒻᒪᑕ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐳᕐᕕᓐᓴᕐᓯᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕙᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᕐᒋᑎᖏᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖏᑦ ᓯᐊᒻᒥᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᒥᖅᓂ ᐊᔾᔨᑲᓴᖅᑕᖓᓂ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖓ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖓᓂ 1/3 (ᐃᓗᐃᑑᑉ ᐱᖓᔪᐊᑕ) ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᖓᑕ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖓᓂᒃ.

ᑕᐃᓱᒪᒻᒪᓂ ᐅᒃᑐᐱᓇ 1992 ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᓇᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᖓ ᐊᑎᓕᐅᓇᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᒪᑕ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ, ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᖓᕕᑯᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ. ᑖᓇ ᐱᒻᒪᓇᐅᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᖕ ᓇᒃᒥᓂᖅᑲᕐᓗᓂ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ.

ᐊᕿᓐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᑲᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᕙᐅᑲᓂᓇᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅᓴᓂᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᖅᓴᖏᓄᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᑭᓯᓗᖅᑕᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ, ᓱᓕᑲᓂᖅ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᔪᓇᕙᓗᒍ ᐃᖏᑯᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓈᒻᒪᖅᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓇᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓯᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ.

ᐊᑭᖏᑕ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑕ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᐳᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ

person years in 1999 when the new public government assumes legal responsibility for service delivery. Finally it grows to 930.0 incremental person years in 2008.

- It will take 1,635.5 person years to operate the new public government for the Nunavut Territory in 2008. Of this total 705.5 are already in place in currently active regional operations (705.5 + 930.0 = 1,635.5).

- It is estimated that **75% of the executive level positions** required to operate the new government structure will be filled through local native hire.

- With careful attention to human resource and an aggressive recruitment and training strategy, **460.5** of the new positions created to operate Nunavut could be filled through local hire by **2008**. If a conservative methodology is applied this figure would be **177** positions.

- The incremental operating costs that will be incurred to sustain the new government structure are estimated to be $9.6 million in 1992, $11.6 million in 1999 growing to **$84.6 million per year in 2008**. The **$84.6 million** represents the **only new additional ongoing costs** associated with running the Government of Nunavut after 2008.

- One time costs incurred prior to commencement of full operations are estimated to be **$333.9 million**:

  - new government capital costs **$68.9 million**
  - additional community capital costs **$232.3 million**
  - training costs **$8.5 million**
  - other (e.g. legislation, transition management) **$24.2 million**.

- These one time costs will be expended from 1992 to 2008. No other one time costs are anticipated.

The economic impacts resulting from incremental spending in Nunavut were calculated using the GNWT Bureau of Statistics' Input-Output Model.

Impact was calculated for employment opportunities, gross domestic product, and gross spending. Capital construction expenditures up to full government operations (1992-2008) will generate 1,135 employment opportunities, spending will exceed $411 million dollars, and the gross domestic product for Nunavut will approach $117 million dollars. Once the government is fully operational, incremental spending after 2008 will generate 622 employment opportunities, spending will exceed $146 million dollars, and the gross domestic product for Nunavut will approach $33 million dollars.

The GNWT and TFN assisted in identifying the needs and directions governing the conduct of this study.

1. There were to be no predetermined limits concerning the structure for the Nunavut public government: the organization was to be designed to meet the needs identified.

2. The structure of the public government of the West was assumed to be constant to that in existence, in 1991, as was the cost data generated for 1991 GNWT Study which provided some of the foundation for this work. No assumptions were made about the structure of the GNWT after division. Savings that might rise from the restructuring of the new Western Government and any other reduction in resource requirements arising from division were not to be taken into account. The incremental operating costs identified as additional ongoing costs are not net-additional costs to the federal government in that they do not take into account possible cost savings from the West nor possible regional operation savings in the Eastern Arctic.

3. The two governments that would emerge from the process of division would be legally distinct and of equal status.

4. The structure of the Nunavut public government would enhance local accountability and community based decision making.

ᐱᔭᕇᑦᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2008. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ (a) ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑕᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖕᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᖑᑭᓱᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ (b) ᐱᑎᑎᑭᓕᕈᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑭᓐᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑕᖕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᕿᓐᓇᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᒻᒥᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓇᐅᕐᐸᑦ (ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕗᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᒐᔭᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᓇᓇᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᕐᒍᓄᑦ 1999 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 2008). ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᐸᑦᑕ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖅᑯᕐᐸᓕᕐᓂᐊᕐᓯᑎᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓇᑎᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᓗᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᓯᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᑎᐅᕙᖕᑐᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ.

ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖕᒪᑦ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᖕᒐᓗᓂ. ᓱᕋᓕᕐᕋᖕ ᑕᕙᖕᒐᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1992 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 1999 ᑕᕋᓇᓗ ᐊᑯᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᐊᕐᓯᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᕐᑐᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑐᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᔭᕇᑦᑕᐅᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ. ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1999, ᓄᑖᖕ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓴᖕ ᐱᔭᕇᑦᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᖕ. ᑕᕙᖕᒐᑦ 1999 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2008, ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓇᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᑦ.

ᐃᖅᒥᑯᓕᖕᒐᓕᕆᖕᓯᓂ ᑲᑐᔾᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓇᐅᕐᐳᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓗᓂ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕆᐊᖃᓇᐅᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓇᓇᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ ᑭᑯᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓴᖕᓄᑦ. ᖃᐅᔾᔭᐅᒋᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ, ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᓇᓕᐊᓄᑐᐃᓇᖕ ᓱᕋᓂᖕᓴᑎᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕆᖕᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᕐᒪᖕᑕ ᑲᑐᔾᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓇᐅᕐᑐᖕ ᑕᕙᓇ ᐊᑭᖕᓴᖕᑭᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ, ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᓯᕙᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒋᐊᖃᕐᖓᑕ.

ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ, 705.5-ᖑᖕᒪᑕ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᔪᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᓇᖕᓇᖕᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᖑᓛᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1999. ᒪᓕᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᓄᖕ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᖃᓇᑕᖃᕐᕕᖕᓴᖕᖓ ᐊᖕᓚᖕᕕᓚᓇᕕᖕᓴᖕᖓ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᓇᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᐊᕐᓗᖕ:

* ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1992 ᓄᖕᑎᕐᑐᐃᕙᓕᐊᑭᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ, 22 ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᑭᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐅᓄᕐᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓯᑎᒃ 289-ᓄᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 1999 ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᓄᑖᖕ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᒐ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑭᖑᓕᕐᐸᖕᒐᒍᑦ ᐅᓄᕐᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ 930.0-ᓂᒃ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2008.

* ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ 1,635.5 ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓇᑕᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᐊᕐᒍ- 2008. ᑕᕙᖕᒐᑦ ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ 705.5

5. The level of service currently available to citizens would be kept constant and be maintained uninterrupted during development of the new public government. The current structure for delivery of regional services will remain intact.

6. The cost of creating and operating the new government would reflect the scope of its responsibilities and the nature of the geographic region and citizens it would serve.

7. The number of local hires associated with creating and operating the new public government would be maximized consistent with an orderly and efficient transition process.

In combination these directions created a framework very different from that used in previous work. The capacity to custom design the structure to meet the needs of the Eastern Arctic, rather than duplicate existing structures, in conjunction with the direction to enhance community-based decision making and maintain services, removed many of the restrictions surrounding other work, and created opportunities to streamline and simplify structures.

The organization structure and resources allocated represent a configuration that will work. The needs expressed by stakeholders will be met. Deploying this level of resources through this organization will enable the government to meet its responsibilities to citizens of the region, and manage the transition process in a way that preserves service levels.

The strategy set out for enhancement of local hiring during the transition process sets a conservative agenda that gradually expands local hiring during the transition process. This approach takes into account several important factors.

The strategy is designed to maximize the number of senior executive and decision making positions filled through local hire. This reflects the direction to maximize the influence of local residents, and the reality of an organization structure that will have a reduced need for clerical support, and a regionally distributed administrative framework. It also acknowledges that other levels of government, the administrative structure for the Comprehensive Land Claim, and the private sector will all be competing for qualified staff, and in the process will expand opportunities beyond those identified in this study.

The baseline department-level data generated in the 1991 GNWT Costing Study provided the initial data base for this work.

Part of the mandate for this study was to review earlier work and assess its relevance to establishing costs for the creation of Nunavut. Background research for this study identified nine other pieces of work that touched upon the creation and management of a government for Nunavut. Some of this preceding work was useful as an initial reference point, but the very different directions and needs underlying this study made direct comparison of findings, or utilization of anything other than some baseline data, impossible. Specific detailed examination of reorganization and streamlining possibilities, and detailed examination of the transition process, distinguishes this work from its predecessors.

The proposed organization structure utilizes four program delivery departments, supported by the group of core administrative and support functions necessary to create and maintain a territorial government. The approach creates a capacity to use community based structures where appropriate.

The transition process was designed to meet specific realities. There will be a long period of interdependence between the governments of the East and West while they re-establish themselves as distinct entities, and maintain existing service levels. Of particular importance was the direction to minimize the amount of in-migration needed to staff the new organization.

A five phase transition process is proposed. The first two stages (1992/93 and 1993/94) are used to establish a basic decision making and strategic planning infrastructure, and put in place the framework for those functions identified as essential to create and maintain a

ᐃᓕᑦᑭᓯᒪᖅᒪᑕ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒪᔪᒥ (705.5 + 930.0 =1,635.5).

* ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ **75-ᓗᕐᓴᖅ** **ᑕᑯᓇᖕᒪᑦ** **ᐊᖕᒪᔪᖅᖑᓂᕐᓴᓂᑦ** **ᐃᓂᖕᓴᓂᑦ** ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑭᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖕᒪ ᐃᓕᓂᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑭᖕᑐᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᕐᓂᑯᔪᓂᒃ.

* ᓇᐅᓯᕐᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᕝᓕᐊᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ, **460.5** ᑕᑯᓇᖕᒪᑦ ᓄᑖᓂᑦ ᐃᓂᖕᓴᓂᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᔪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᐃᓂᑖᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑭᖕᑐᓂ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ **2008.** ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᓕ ᐱᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᖕᐸᑕ ᐊᓄᕐᓂᓇᒐᔭᕐᐸᖏᑦ **177** ᐃᓂᖕᓴᐃᑦ.

* ᐅᓄᕐᓯᕝᓕᐊᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖕᒪᑕ ᐊᑭᖕᒪ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑕᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖕᒪ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓗᓂ $9.6 ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ ᐊᕐᖑᒻᒥ 1992, $11.6 ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ ᐊᕐᖑᒻᒥ 1999 ᐱᑭᕐᓗᓂ **$84.6 ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ** **ᐊᕐᖑᑕᒻᒪᖅ** **ᐊᕐᖑᒻᒥ** **2008.** **$84.6 ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ** ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ **ᑭᓯᐊᓂ** **ᓄᑖᓂᒃ** **ᐱᑲᓂᕐᐸᑕ** **ᐃᖏᕋᓕᐊᔪᑦ** **ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ** ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᒪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ 2008.

* ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒪ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓇᖕᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ **$333.9** ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ:

  - ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᖕᓴᖕᒪᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᒪ **$68.9** ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ
  - ᓱᓐᓕᑲᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑭᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᖕᓴᖕᒪᑕ ᐊᑭᖕᒪ **$232.3** ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ
  - ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᕝᕕᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᒪ **$8.5** ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ
  - ᐊᓯᖏᑦ (ᓱᕐᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ, ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖅ) **$24.2** ᒥᓐᓕᐊᑦ.

* ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᓕᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕝᖕᒪᑦ 1992-ᒥᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2008. ᐊᓯᖃᔭᖏᓇᓱᑎᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᑭᖕᓴᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ.

ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓄᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐅᓄᕐᓯᑎᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᖕᑐᖃᐅᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑕ ᓈᓴᐃᔨᖏᓂᒃ ᐅᖕᑐᕋᐅᑎᑭᕝᕙᖕᑕᖏᓂᒃ.

ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒪ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑖᕈᓇᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ, ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒻᒥᖕᓂ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᑲᑎᓱᒥᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑭᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ. ᖃᓇᑕᖃᕐᕕᖕᓴᖅ ᐊᖕᓚᖕᕕᓇᓇᖕᕕᖃᕐᕕᖕᓴᐅᑉ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᖕᒪᑕ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᓇᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐊᓕᕐᐸᑦ (1992-2008)

territorial government. Legal, financial and legislative capacities are among these functions.

At the end of the third phase (1994 to 1999) the Government of Nunavut comes into existence. At this stage the government will have the essential functions only. Remaining services are delivered through agreements with other governments or institutions, with the GNWT proposed as playing a major role. In stages four (1999 to 2004) and five (2004 to 2008) the new government undertakes additional direct delivery of services in accordance with the development of its technical and human resource capacities. The transition process commences with appointment of the Nunavut Implementation Commission, and ends, under the long transition, in 2008. The essential functions commence operation in 1999, with the first transfer of direct program delivery occurring in 2004.

For comparative purposes a "short transition" plan is also set out. This plan would have all programs come under the direct control of the Government of Nunavut in 1999. The "short transition" process would end at this point.

The "short transition" scenario is set out to show the implications of extending transition over a longer period of time. For example, the short transition scenario allows comparisons which indicate that the more gradual phased approach will reduce significantly the amount of in-migration necessary to run the new government.

ᐱᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ 1,135 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖕᓴᑦ, ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ $411 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒧᑦ ᖃᓂᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ $117 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᕐᑕᕙᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᓇᓕᕐᐸᑦ, ᐊᖏᖅᓕᒋᐊᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ 2008 ᐱᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ 622 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑖᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ, ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ $146 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᖃᓂᒋᓂᐊᕐᓯᓂᐅᒃ $33 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᑦ.

ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

1 ᐱᑕᖃᔭᖏᑐᖅ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕋᔭᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓴᖓ; ᑲᑐᔾᔨᖕᓴᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

2. ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑯᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᓇᓴᐃᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐊᕐᕌᒻᒥ 1991, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᕐᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖃᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᕐᕌᒻᒧᑦ 1991 ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓯᒻᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᓗᓂᓗ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ, ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᖏᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕋᔭᕆᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐊᕕᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒐᔭᖏᑐᑦ ᓴᖅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᑕᐅᕙᓚᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᑦ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓴᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᓗᖅᑕᖏᑦ ᐱᕐᓱᕙᓕᕐᕕᐅᔪᖅᓴᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᓴᖅᑭᕋᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᓂᐊᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᖏᑐᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ. ᐊᖏᖅᓕᕙᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᐅᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑲᑎᑕᐅᖏᒪᑕ ᐊᑭᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᑯᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖏᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖏᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᓇᖅᓇᖓᓂ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ.

3. ᒪᕈᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᓴᖅᑭᔭᕐᑑᒃ ᑕᕙᖓᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕈᐅᒐᔭᖏᓛᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᐱᔪᓇᐅᑎᖃᕋᔭᕐᑑᒃ.

4. ᐊᖏᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᓇᑎᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓂᕐᓴᐅᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂ.

5. ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᔭᖏᑐᖅ ᑕᓇᓴᐃᓇᐅᖏᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓱᓐᓂᕋᓂ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂ ᓄᑖᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅᓴᖅ. ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓐᓂᔭᖏᑐᖅ.

6. ᐊᑭᖓ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᑕᐅᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᓗ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᒪ ᒪᓕᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᕋᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑭᔭᖅᓴᒻᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖑᐊᑎᒍᑦ ᓇᓂᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕋᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ.

7. ᖃᓯᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖑᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ

1. INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE OF THIS REPORT

Dividing the Northwest Territories into two distinct regions with independent governments represents a major step in the process of recognizing the needs and aspirations of the citizens of Canada's north. The Boundary vote has been conducted. The Land Claim vote will occur in November, 1992. When this is complete attention will turn to developing the administrative framework for the new Nunavut government. While this is occurring the existing GNWT is also restructuring.

Empowering and equipping a new organization to carry out the complex processes of government is not an easily proscribed project with a distinct beginning and end. Rather, it is an evolutionary process that, to be successful, must reflect the realities of existing circumstances and the gradually emerging consensus among citizens of the North concerning the kind of government they wish to have. This will be a dynamic and changing process. It will require a great deal of communication, understanding and cooperation among those involved. It will also require a great deal of information.

This report is designed to be a stage in the continuing process of generating and refining information in support of this process. Other work has gone before it, and a great deal will follow.

The directives and assumptions used to guide the work covered by this report were provided by the Federal government, in consultation with the GNWT and TFN and differed significantly from previous work. In particular they permitted re-examination of existing organization structures and processes in terms of the needs and realities of Nunavut. They also acknowledged the importance of the transition to a fully operational institution. The structure for which costs were to be determined did not have to be a mirror image of any other government, and the process of getting from "here" to "there" was to receive more specific attention than it had previously.

This expanded approach moved this study from an effort to further refine costing of a "mirror image" organization (Nunavut was to parallel the existing GNWT structure in the GNWT Study) to costing of a preliminary strategic plan for transition, and the final results of that transition. This report has more strategic content than previous work. A summary assessment of previous work is found in Appendix A.

Although some have referred to this study as a "blueprint" for transition it is more accurate to think of it as a "preliminary indication" of what the process, organization structure and costs could be. It is a point from which the journey can begin. The final "blueprint", and the commitment to carry it out, will require detailed implementation work driven in large part by those living and governing in the North, and those who support their efforts.

IMPORTANT REALITIES

This study must be understood within the overall context of the principles and assumptions outlined in Appendix B. The current realities of population size, growth and dispersion, unemployment and education, and the influence and variable structures of local and regional governments are also relevant facts. They are facts that have influenced the assumptions and needs identified by stakeholders. They are facts that will determine

ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᑖᒻᒥ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓐᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᐸᐅᑎᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕋᔭᕐᐳᑦ ᒪᓕᒃᓗᓂ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᐊᔪᖏᓂᖅ ᓇᖏᓂᖅ ᐊᔾᐅᖏᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᔪᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕋᔭᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᖕᑕᐅᖕᒐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖕᒐᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᖕᓇᒻᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒻᒥ, ᐃᒻᒪᓇᖕᒐᖕᒐᖏᑐᖅ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᔪᐊᕐᑕᐅᑐᐃᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᒪᓕᖕᓗᓂ ᑐᕋᓇᓇᓱᖕᓗᒍ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᕕᑎᔪᒻᒪᔭᖕᒐ ᐊᑲᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓕᕈᓇᖕᒐᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑏᖕᑐᓂ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᓇᕐᐊᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᓚᐅᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᐲᕐᓯᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓴᑕᐃᔭᖕᓴᐃᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒐᔭᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᕕᐅᒍᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᑎᑎᔪᓇᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᒐᔭᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᖏᖕᓯᒻᒪᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐ.

ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑑᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑎᖕᒐᒪᑕ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕙᐊᕋᔭᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕋᔭᖏᑐᖅ. ᐱᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᓯᕋᔾᖃᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᕙᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᑦ. ᑐᓂᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᑕᕝᓇ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᒐᒪᑯᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖕᓴᒻᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓄᒋᔭᖏᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑖᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᒪᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᒥᐊᓂᓇᓱᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᔪᕐᓯᑎᐊᕐᐸᖕᓂᓇᔭᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ.

ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑏᒻᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᕈᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕐᖓᓗᐊᖅ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖏᑐᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᓂᓕ ᐃᖏᕋᔪᖕᐸᓕᐊᔪᓇᕐᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑏᒻᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖃᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕈᒻᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᐳᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕝᓇ.

ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᐸᐅᓇᓱᐊᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᕙᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓂᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᓇᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑏᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᖕᓗᒃ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᖏᖕᓕᓂᕐᐸᐅᕙᓗᒍ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᑎᑎᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᑏᒻᒥᐅᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᓕᓇᖕᓂᖕᒐ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑑᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖕᒐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᑎᑎᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᓇᕿᑕᕐᑎᑐᐃᓇᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑐᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔪᓇᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᐅᑎᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᐱᕕᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ. ᑕᑯᑎᑎᓕᓗᓂᓗ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᐅᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐ ᐱᔪᑎᓕᓗᒍ ᑐᑭᓯᒻᒪᓇᑎᐊᕐᓱᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖏᓂᕐᑖᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖑᕋᓱᐊᕋᔭᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᔪᖏᑎᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓴᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖏᓕᕙᓕᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᖑᑖᓄᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐅᑯᓇᓂ ᖃᐅᔾᔾᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᓂ.

ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔾᔾᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑎᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ 1991-ᒥ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᕐ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᒋᒐᔭᕐᑕᖕᒐᑕ ᖃᐅᔾᔾᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖕᒪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᑖᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᒐᓚᐅᕐᑐᓄᑦ.

the pace and direction of changes in government structure and service delivery in the Eastern Arctic.

The design of the organization for governing Nunavut, and the transition process for implementation are, in essence, an attempt to cope with these facts. Approaches to organization design and costing different from those recommended in this report would have to be evaluated in terms of their capacity to effectively address the issues raised by these potent realities.

STUDY SCOPE AND GENERAL METHODOLOGY

Evolution of this study must be understood within the context of previous work, and the circumstances that prevailed during the term of this undertaking (Appendix A). This report now reflects needs as they emerged, and as such differs significantly from original intentions and previous work.

THE ORIGINAL APPROACH

The original approach to costing, outlined in The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group (CLCG) response to the Request for Proposal, indicated that the process would require development of a consensus among stakeholders concerning the major principles and needs to be accounted for in the development of potential organization designs. After developing a consensus, three alternative designs for the new organization would be proposed. Consensus on the suitability of these alternatives would lead to costing of each.

This approach would produce costs for three alternative organizations, at a single point in time.

THE NEXT STEP

As support material was evaluated and preliminary discussions were held with stakeholders, it became evident a costing approach anchored to a single point in time would not provide the information needed to support decision making since some identified needs involved a transition process.

At the January 13 and 14, 1992 meetings in Edmonton a new approach was adopted. Instead of costing three alternatives fixed at one point in time, CLCG would cost the "core services" needed for a start-up structure for Nunavut, a "full services" structure for Nunavut start-up, a "full services" structure for Nunavut at the end of a transition period, and a "full services" structure for the GNWT at the end of the same period (Enclosed portion of Exhibit 1).

The Federal government's additional costs, and costs directly linked to land claim settlements were not to be included.

This approach recognized the importance of determining and costing the mandate and functions to be in place at start-up in order to plan and cost the transition period to that point. It also recognized the emerging reality that it would not be possible to put in place a fully functioning government at start-up while continuing to meet the principle of minimizing in-migration.

THE CURRENT APPROACH

Although technically valid (given assumptions at that point), the approach adopted at the Edmonton meeting was adjusted because of the GNWT decision to begin implementing parts of the "Strength at Two Levels" report. The structure of the GNWT had become a "moving target". It was not possible to sustain the assumptions needed to put in place a structure for the NWT that could be costed effectively. To do so could also have been perceived as unsolicited speculation on the final structure and cost of a long term redesign of an existing organization; a sensitive exercise to be led by the elected members of the GNWT legislature.

It was agreed that the costing undertaken in this work would encompass the cost of transition to

ᐃᓚᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᔪᑎᒋᓚᐅᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᑕᓯᒻᒪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓂᐅᑉ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᑎᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓇᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᓱᑎᒍ ᓱᕈᓕᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖅᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ. ᖃᓄᐃᑉᖅᓯᒻᒪᓚᐅᕐᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᑯᓄᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᓯᓚᐅᓇᕗᑦ 9-ᖑᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᖅᑐᐃᖅᒥᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᖅᓴᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ. ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᕕᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᕈᓕᕐᑉᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᔪᓴᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᔾᒋᖏᓚᓇᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᕕᒋᔭᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᑯᓇᓂ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᔪᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ, ᐅᓚᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᓇᓕᐊᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓚ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᓚᓇᓂᑯᑦ, ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᒪᑦ. ᐃᖏᑯᓚᖓᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᐃᑲᓂᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᓚᐊᔪᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᔪᓇᖑᓇᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᒐᕙᒪᑦᐸᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ, ᐊᔾᔨᖏᔪᑎᒋᓚᐃᑦ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓴᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᓇᖓᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᓱᕈᓕᑎᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᓂᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᑦ.

ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᔪᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᖅᓴᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᒪᑦ ᓱᑕᒻᒪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕋᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓚᓇᖅᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᕕᐅᔪᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖅᓯᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᓄᑖᖑᔪᒻᒥ. ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᖅᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᐃᒋᐊᖃᕐᖑᑦ.

ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᑎᑭᕕᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᖏᑯᓚᖓᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ. ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᖏᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᑲᓇᖅᓇᒻᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᐊᓚᓂᕐᒥ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕙᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᒃ ᐃᖏᑯᓚᖓᓂᕐᒥᕐᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖅᓯᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᓂᒃ. ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓇᔭᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓚᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓗᐊᖑᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᑎᑭᑎᑕᐅᕙᖑᓇᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᕐᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᑦ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ.

ᑕᒃᓚᒻᒪᐃᓚᖓᖑᔭᐅᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓚᐊᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ. ᓱᕈᓕᕐᔪᖓ (1992-93 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 1993-94) ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓗᒋᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓴᐅᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖅᓴᒥᒃ. ᒪᓕᒃᑎᒍᑦ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᒃᓕᐅᖑᕈᓇᕐᓂᖅ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᖑᖅᒪᑕ ᐃᖏᕋᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ.

ᐃᓱᐊᓂ ᐱᖓᔪᒋᔭᖓᑕ (1994 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 1999) ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓴᕿᕋᔭᕐᑐᖅ. ᑕᕝᕙᓂᓂᕐᑉᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᒋᒋᐊᖃᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᑦ. ᐊᓱᓗᖅᑕᖏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑎᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᓗ. ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓚᓇᖑᔭᐅᖅᒪᑕ. ᓯᑕᒻᒪᖓᓂ 1999 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2004) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕝᕙᒻᒪᖓ (2004 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2008) ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᑲᓂᓇᐊᖃᕋᔭᕐᑐᖅ ᓇᖅᒥᓂᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᖅᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕈᓂᕐᑐᓂᒃ.

April 1, 1999, the cost of a group of core government functions in place on April 1 1999, and the cost of "full operations" by government on that date (shaded portions of Exhibit 1). As well there would be an estimate for the cost of full operations at a specific transition point, to be determined by identifying the point at which there would be insufficient benefits (e.g. in-migration) to further delay the transfer of services. There would be no costing of any operations of the GNWT. In acknowledgement of the likelihood of change emerging from the combination of implementation of "Strength at Two Levels" and the recommendations of the Western Constitutional Commission.

The organization would be designed and costed in accordance with the stated directions.

1. There were to be no predetermined limits concerning the structure for government: the organization was to be designed to meet the needs identified.

2. The structure of the Government of the West was assumed to be constant, as was the cost data generated for the GNWT Study. No assumptions were made about the structure of the GNWT after division. Savings that might arise from the restructuring of the New Western Government and any other reductions in resource requirements arising from division were not to be taken into account.

3. The two governments that would emerge from the process of Division would be legally distinct and of equal status.

4. The structure of government would enhance local accountability and community based decision making.

5. The level of service currently available to citizens would be maintained uninterrupted during development of the new government. The current structure for delivery of regional services will remain intact.

6. The cost of creating and operating the new government would reflect the scope of its responsibilities and the nature of the geographic region and citizens it would serve.

7. The number of local hires associated with creating and operating the new government was to be maximized consistent with an orderly and efficient transition process.

8. Costs associated with Federal Government Departments and Agencies, and Land Claims, were not to be included.

9. Regional program structures currently in place were not to be addressed.

IMPORTANT THEMES

Several themes have consistently appeared during the consultation process undertaken for this study. The concept of evolution has been mentioned. Those involved know about the change process they are part of, and that the process will be driven by the needs they identify and the objectives they choose to pursue.

The level of interdependence is also recognized. Those involved are and will remain dependent upon each other.

There are also significant limitations faced by those involved. Difficulties of population size and dispersion, limited quantities of human and financial capital and the challenges of maintaining existing services, while also managing a complex change process, have a major impact on the processes and options available.

This report is tabled in a spirit of co-operation and shared objectives. We acknowledge not everyone will agree with every element of the approaches we have suggested or the costs we have identified, but we hope our attempts to work within the directives provided have

ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᒋᐊᕋᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔨᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐃᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᓕᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ, ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓇᓱᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐊᕋᒍᒻᒥ 2008. ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓕᕆᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓕᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᕋᒍᒻᒥ 1999, ᓯᕗᓕᕐᐸᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᕋᒍᒻᒥ 2004.

ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᒪᖕᒐ "ᓇᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ" ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖅᑕᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᓇᒃᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᒐᑦ ᑎᑭᓇᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᐊᕋᒍᒻᒥ 1999. "ᓇᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ" ᐊᕐᕌᑎᒋᔭᖓ ᐃᓱᓕᒐᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᑕᕗᓇ.

"ᓇᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ" ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕗᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᒐᔭᕐᓂᓕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ. ᓱᕐᓗ, ᓇᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᔪᓇᕐᒪᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᓗᓂ ᓱᑲᐃᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᑎᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᖓᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᒧᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᒧᑦ.

resulted in a framework from which meaningful and cooperative planning and decision making can begin.

We would like to note in particular the extremely co-operative and constructive approach taken by all stakeholders during this study. The issues involved are complex and sensitive. The affected parties dealt with them effectively, and provided the consulting team with timely and clear directions essential to completion of such a complex task within specified time frames.

1. ᓱᓇᐅᓐᒪᖓᑕ

ᑐᕋᕆᓇᓱᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐅᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᒃᑳᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ

ᐊᕕᓐᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᔾᑏᖏᓗᓂ ᓇᖏᓂᕐᓗ ᐃᖏᑯᓕᖓᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᖔᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖓᒪᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᔭᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᐅᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᖅᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᖑᑎᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᖓᑕ. ᑭᖅᓕᖅᓴᖅ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᕕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖅᒪᑦ. ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᓄᕕᐱᕆᒻᒥ, 1992. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᖅᑉᑦ ᓴᒐᔭᕐᔾᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔪᑎᖅᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᑕᐅᑐᒋᒐᔭᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᓴᐅᓂᖅᓴᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓂᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᑉᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔭᕇᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᐋᕿᖅᓱᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓇᔭᕆᔭᖅ.

ᓴᖏᓴᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᓱᑎᑎᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᖃᓕᕐᑎᑎᓂᖅ ᓄᑖᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᑐᔾᔭᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᓴᖃᖅᑯᓗᒍ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᓗᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᑐᑯᓗᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔭᕇᕐᑐᑎᒃ ᖃᓄᐅᐃᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᔭᐅᖏᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓ ᐃᓱᐊᓗ ᑐᕋᕆᔭᐅᓇᓱᐊᕐᑐᖅ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂᖓᕐᓕ, ᐱᕙᓕᐊᖅᒪᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ, ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᓂᐊᕈᓂ, ᒪᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᔭᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᓴᖅᑮᓕᕆᖅᑐᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᑲᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᓱᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖃᕐᕕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔪᖅ ᓴᖅᑭᕐᓕᐊᓗᓂ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᒋᕙᓕᐊᔭᖏᑦ ᐃᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᓄᖑᑎᖏᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥᐅᑕᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᖃᕈᒪᖔᒪᖓᑕ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᔾᔨᒐᓂ ᐊᓱᔾᔨᕐᓕᐊᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ. ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔪᑎᑯᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑐᒻᒪᓇᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᐅᑎᑎᐊᕐᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒪᖃᑎᒋᓐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᒋᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓐᒥᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ. ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓐᓴᖃᑎᐊᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᑐᓴᐅᒻᒪᔪᑎᓐᓴᓂᒃ.

ᑖᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᒃᑳᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖔᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓗᓂ ᓄᖃᐅᔭᐅᔭᖅᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐋᕿᑎᐊᓇᐊᕐᑕᐅᓕᐊᖃᑕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᑏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ. ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑭᖑᓂᑎᓂ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᓇᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᕕᐅᓇᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᓇᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᑎᓂ. ᓇᒻᒧᖓᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑖᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᑎᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᑯᓄᑦ, ᐊᐱᕐᓱᕐᕝᕕᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᔭᒃᑯᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᖓᕕᑯᓂᒃ ᐊᒻ ᓗ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓕᓇᖅᓱᓂᐅᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓕᐅᕐᑐᒻᒥᐅᖓᓂᑦ. ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᑎᑎᔪᓇᖅᒪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕈᓇᖅᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐋᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᕙᖅᑕᖓ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓴᖅᑮᓕᕆᖅᑐᑦ ᓱᓕᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᒪᒥ. ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᓕᐅᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᑉᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᓕᕆᓕᕈᓇᕐᓗᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᕆᖑᕐᓗᓂ. ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᑭᖅᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᓗᓕ ᑕᕐᕐᑐᑎᑯᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᖅᒪᑦ ᐊᓱᓗᖅᑕᖅᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ

2. ORGANIZATION DESIGN

THE NEW ORGANIZATION - A QUESTION OF BALANCE

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

The organization design set out in Exhibit 2 was developed using the methodology outlined in detail in Appendices C and D.

Program functions critical to basic government operations, called core functions, were identified first. Remaining program functions were then reviewed and classified using the criteria set out in Appendix D-1, and Exhibit D-2. After general program groups were established, more specific functions were evaluated. These functions were combined with others, left intact, or eliminated based on their viability (some were just too small to operate alone), duplication and overlap with other services, or ongoing need.

This design addresses the challenges raised by the stated principles and assumptions (Appendix B), and the valid concerns raised by stakeholders. The design addresses the two major categories of concerns raised:

1. **Regionalization** All Deputy Ministers are now responsible for a functional area: there are no Deputy Ministers exclusively responsible for a specific region. The need to reflect regional influences is accommodated through the direct link between the Deputy Minister and the program director in each region. Those responsible for a program in a region have direct access to senior level decision makers and policy support, and will be able to ensure regional needs and realities are considered in the process of policy development and service design. Regional program directors are accountable for all aspects of program delivery in their region. This approach addresses the concerns of stakeholders, while also maintaining a strong regional influence.

2. **Functional Groupings** There are four program groups used in this approach. This produces a symmetric distribution of responsibilities, and effectively deals with a broad range of program responsibilities. The design represents a significant collapsing of programs and will permit development of an efficient and effective structure. Allocating senior level policy and advisory staff in the deputy minister's offices, for example, will permit a more efficient use of support materials such as information systems and support staff.

   This is an important characteristic of the proposed organization. Because the pool of skilled analysts will be limited, it is critical that the synergy and efficiencies gained by having those involved in similar or overlapping disciplines working closely together be utilized. The re-deployment of positions anticipated in the costing exercise reflects our judgments concerning the efficiencies possible through this approach.

As the charts in Appendix D indicate, the organization design acknowledges and maintains existing Boards and Agencies, ensures a single deputy minister is responsible for finance, human resources and related support services in each region, and accommodates further allocation of responsibility to local government as the parameters of regionalization are further refined among stakeholders, and local capacity grows.

Use of this approach in program grouping also addresses accountability. There would be a single Deputy Minister and politician responsible for each program grouping.

ᐊᕐᓂᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ "ᑕᐃᑲᖕᖓᓂᖓᑕ" "ᑕᕗᖕᖓᓂᖓᓄᑦ" ᓴᖕᖓᐃᐅᑲᓂᓇᐊᖃᓇᐅᑦᑐᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑭᖑᓂᑎᓂᐅᓇᐅᑦᑐᒻᒥᐅᖕᖓᓂᑦ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᖏᖕᓕᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᖕᖓᔭᐅᐃᒋᔭᖕᖓ ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᖕᓱᔭᐅᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᑲᓂᕐᑎᐅᑕᕐᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ "ᑕᕐᕐᕑᑎᑯᑦ ᐊᔨᓱᐊᖕᖓᑎᒍᑦ" ᑲᑐᔨᔭᐅᓗᓂ (ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᖓ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑦ ᐃᒋᕐᒋᐊᖃᓇᐅᕐᒪᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥᒥ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓇᐅᕐᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ) ᐊᑭᖕᖓᓄᑦ ᓱᕗᓕᕐᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖕᑕᐅᓂᖕᖓᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᔪᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᖑᓕᕐᔪᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᒐᔭᕐᓂᖓ ᓱᓂᕐᔪᓕᐅᔪᑦ. ᑖᑯᐊ ᐅᓕᑲᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓗᐊᓂᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᓱᒻᒪᓂᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓚᐅᕐᑐᓂᐅᖕᖓᓂᑦ. ᓇᐃᖕᓕᒋᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᔪᐃᓂᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ A.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᓐᖕᑕᖓᑦ ᑖᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ "ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᔪᐊᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ" ᓱᓂᕐᔪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᓕᓂᕐᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᒋᐊᖓᓂᒃ "ᓱᕗᓕᐅᓗᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᔪᑎ" ᓱᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᐊᕐᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ, ᑲᑐᔨᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕᓗ ᓱᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ. ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᒪᒍ ᐊᕐᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᑕ ᐃᖏᕐᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ. ᑭᖑᓕᕐᕐᓱᐅᑎ "ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᔪᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᓗᓂ", ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓇᓇᖕᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᔭᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᓄᖓ ᓇᔪᒐᖃᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔪᖕᓂᖕᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᕐᓱᔭᑕᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ.

ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓚᓇᖕᑐᑦ ᓱᓕᓕᔪᑦ

ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᑭᓱᐅᒻᒪᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᑕᐅᑐᖑᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ B. ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᓱᓕᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖓ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐅᓄᕐᓂᖏᑦ, ᐃᓄᒍᕐᕐᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᐅᕐᑐᑦ, ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᖏᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖕᐱᒋᑎᑎᖃᑕᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖏᓗ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᐃᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᑕᐅᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᒥᖕᒪᑕ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᖑᖕᒪᑕ ᓱᓕᓕᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓐᖕᓗ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᑦᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᖑᔭᔪᓄᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᖑᖕᒪᑕ ᓱᓕᓕᔪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐃᖏᕐᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᓱᑲᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒧᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᐊᓱᔭᕐᓱᕐᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᓇᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᐊᖕᓇᒻᒥ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ.

ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᑲᑐᔨᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᔪᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐃᒻᒪᓇ, ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᐃᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ

MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

The structure reflects our belief that management processes and systems can be used to enhance the responsiveness of the structure to the priorities of Nunavut. Information technology can expand communications between regions and Deputy Ministers, (hence the absence of a layer of managers between Regional Directors and Deputy Ministers). Effective consultation and customer access mechanisms can ensure meaningful local input to decision making.

As indicated in Appendix D, the important need for focused customer service access points is added to the existing regional structure. There would be a single point of access to government services in each region, through which a client would be directed to the appropriate point in the organization. This would make it easier to contact relevant government services.

SUMMARY

We believe this government structure and supporting management processes will provide an efficient and effective administrative framework for delivery of services, and will respond to the priorities set by the elected representatives of Nunavut. In particular it meets the challenge of balancing the expressed, but not yet specifically delineated, directive to maximize regionalization of service delivery against the pressure to centralize decision making, in response to the many policy and administrative challenges the organization will face in its early years. As the costing process will indicate, there are also some significant efficiencies associated with this structure.

ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᑦ. ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖔᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒪᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᒃᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐊᑭᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖔᑕ ᑕᐃᑯᖓᓇ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᖑᔭᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐃᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᔪᓇᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕈᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᓄᖓ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓕᕆᑐᐃᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᓄᑦ.

ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓱᑎᒃ

ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒻᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᐳᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑭᖑᓂᑎᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓯᒻᒪᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᒃ (ᐅᐃᒍ A). ᑕᑯᐊᓕ ᑕᕙ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕐᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓚᐅᒃ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᕌᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥᒃ.

ᓯᕗᓕᐅᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ

ᓯᕗᓕᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᑭᖅᓴᖓ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ, ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑕᑯᓄᖓ ᑯᐳᕐ ᓚᐃᐳᕐᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᐃᔭᕐᑎᐅᔪᑦ **(Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group)** ᑭᐅᔪᑎᒋᓚᐅᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᐱᖑᑎᒧᑦ ᑐᕐᓯᕋᐅᑎᒻᒧᑦ, ᑕᑯᑎᑎᓚᐅᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᕕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᑐᐃᓇᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᖑᔨᔪᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓗ ᑭᐅᕕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᑐᔨᔨᐅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ. ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᑐᐃᓇᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖓᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᑦ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᑲᑐᔨᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᑐᕐᓯᕋᐅᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᓱᓂ. ᐊᖏᕐᑐᐃᓇᐅᖅᐸᑕ ᐊᑲᐅᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖓᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕙᖓᑦ ᐊᑭᓇᔭᖅᑕᖏᑦ ᕿᒻᒥᓇᔭᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᕐᒪᑕ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᐸᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᑭᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖓᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᑐᔨᔨᐅᓕᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ, ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓯ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓᓂᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᑎᓂ.

ᐊᓪᓗᕐᕕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑎᑎᕋᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᒋᐊᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕋᔨᔪᑦ, ᓇᓗᓇᕈᓂᓚᐅᕐᐳᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᒋᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᑭᕐᓴᖓ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᒧᑦ ᐃᓕᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᕕᒋᔭᖓᓂᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᒐᔭᖏᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᑕᐅᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᑏᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᕕᖅᓇᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᕕᖅᓗᑎᒃ.

3. TRANSITION - DEVELOPING NUNAVUT

In order to quantify the cost of transition to a separate eastern government, it is necessary to set out a proposed transition process. As was the case for the design of the organization, **there is no single optimum solution to this challenge, but rather one or more options that seem to best accommodate current circumstances**. The process set out in Exhibit 3 and explained in this section meets the challenges as they are currently known. To the extent these change, the process itself would have to change.

This section sets out the overall general influences on the transition process, and an explanation of the five phases used.

MAJOR INFLUENCES ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS

In addition to the general principles and directions set out in Appendix B, there are several specific influences on the transition process that affect the overall timing and sequencing of events.

1. An Occupied Field

Although creation of a new government in the East produces an opportunity to respond to anticipated challenges in new and creative ways, it must be remembered that several levels of government currently exist in this region. Programs operate, and services are provided by individuals whose families and careers are linked to existing structures. Large numbers of current residents depend upon government in significant ways.

This reality means transition must be approached not as the development of an administrative structure from a "clean slate", but rather as the gradual creation of two new organizations from the framework now operating. The overall administrative structure for Nunavut **will not emerge new and intact, but rather will evolve through a series of stages originating in the current reality of government in the North.**

2. Interdependence

Since there are already governing and service delivery structures in place, the transition process should not be approached as a tightly prescribed series of closely controlled stages that will produce a new organization. It is, instead, a general framework for managing the interdependence that will continue to exist among all major stakeholders, and the planning and negotiations that will occur as new institutions emerge in Nunavut.

The individual and collective responsibilities of the GNWT, the new Government of Nunavut, those responsible for implementing the Land Claim, and the Government of Canada, require that each party clearly understands and accepts its role and the roles of others. Close cooperation will be needed to support the objective of all parties, namely a successful transition. This means the transition process must set out the phases involved, and the organizational capacity the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) will need to play its role in the process.

The Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) will play a major role in the early years of the transition process. Created through Part 6 of the Political Accord, the NIC will have nine members, six of whom must be "ordinarily resident" in the "Nunavut Settlement Area". The NIC is to provide advice to the parties on the "creation of Nunavut", including the timetable for assumption of service delivery, the design and funding of training plans and the process for

ᑕᐃᓱᒪᓂ ᒃᓄᐊᕆ 13 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 14, 1992 ᑲᑎᒻᒪᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓐᒪᓐᑕᓐᒥ ᓄᑖᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖏᓱᓚᐅᕐᔪᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑭᖕᒪᖏᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖓᕈᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᓱᕐᒥ ᐱᕕᖕᒪᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᑖᑯᐊ ᑲᒻᒪᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᑯᔾ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓚᐅᔾᕋᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᒪᖓᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕋᔭᕐᔪᑦ "ᐱᕕᖕᒪᓚᓇᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᑎᖕᒪᖕ" ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᖕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᖑᑦ, "ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᓚᓇᒍᓇᓚᕐᑎᓗᒍ" ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᖓ ᓄᓇᖑᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓ, "ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᓚᓇᒍᓇᓚᕐᑎᓗᒍ" ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᖑ ᐃᓱᐊᓂ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ "ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᓚᓇᒍᓇᓚᕐᑎᓗᒍ" ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑦ (ᑖᑯᓇᓂᑐᖕ ᐃᓚᖓ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᒪᖕ 1).

ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᑯᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᒪᖃᓂᑦ ᐊᕿᓕᓇᐊᖃᕐᑕᖏᑦ, ᐊᕿᑦ ᐊᑕᓚᓇᖕᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᑖᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᓕ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᓚᐅᖏᓚᑦ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᖕ ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓱᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᒪᕐᓱᐅᕐᕕᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑎᓕᐅᔭᐊᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᔪᓇᖑᓗᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖕ ᐊᕿᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᓗᒍ ᑕᕗᖓ ᑎᒋᓗᒍ. ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓱᒋᕗᕐᑕᐅᖕ ᓴᕿᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᖕ ᓱᓕᔪᖕ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐃᖏᑯᕐᓗᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓᓂ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᕕᖕᓴᖓ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓗᐊᖑᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᖃᖑᓇᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᐊᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ.

ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᓴᖓᕕᐅᔪᒻᒪᔪᖕ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔭᐅᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓕᓚᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ (ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᓱᒻᒪᓂᐅᑎᓗᒍ), ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᓐᒪᓐᑕᓐᒥ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᑎᓗᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖕ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᒪᕐᓱᐅᓚᐅᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑎᒋᐊᕐᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᖓ "ᓴᖏᓂᖃᕐᓂᖕ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᖓᑎᓗᒍ" ᐅᓂᑲᖑᓚᐅᕐᑐᖕ. ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑕ "ᐃᖏᕋᓗᓂ ᓴᖓᕕᖑᓚᐅᕐᒪᑦ". ᐊᔪᕐᓇᓚᐅᕐᒪᑦ ᐱᓱᒻᒪᔭᐅᖏᓇᓇᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᕿᖓ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᑎᐊᕈᓇᕐᑐᖕ ᓈᒻᒪᖕᑐᒻᒧᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᐸᑕ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᐱᕐᓱᕐᑎᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑭᖑᓕᕐᐸᓱᐅᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᕗᓂᖕ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓱᒻᒪᓗᓂ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᖕ; ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᕕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᖕ ᓂᖑᐊᕐᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᑎᐅᔪᑦ.

ᐊᖏᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᑖᑯᑎᒍᓇᖕ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᔪᑯᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖓᑕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999, ᐊᕿᖓ ᑲᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓚᓇᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᕕᐅᓚᓇᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᑕ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓗᓂ

the "first election of the Government of Nunavut".

Long run success depends, in particular, on maintaining a mutually satisfactory partnership between GNWT and the Government of Nunavut, supported by Federal funding, and program management strategies that meet the long term needs of these two partners.

This approach is currently implied in Part 6 of the Political Accord. The mandate for the NIC sets out its role in helping to establish a process, principles, criteria, designs and timetables, while acknowledging the need for flexibility and mutual adjustment in this process.

3. Law and Administration

A clear distinction must be made between the legal reality of Nunavut, and its administrative and program delivery responsibilities.

This distinction must be made because of the different "drivers" and time frames involved. The legal framework is driven by political needs and wills, the realities of law making in Canada, and the rhythm of the governing process at the Federal level. The administrative framework is driven by factors such as time frames for general and technical education (to minimize in-migration), the development and implementation of information management systems, and the transfer or relocation of individuals and their families.

On April 1, 1999 the Government of Nunavut will have legal authority and accountability commensurate with its status within the framework of governing institutions in Canada. As such it will control distribution of funds used for service delivery, and revenue generation. Although the mechanisms it uses to maintain or modify service delivery may change, and may not involve direct delivery by employees of the Government of Nunavut, accountability for decisions affecting service delivery will clearly rest with the new government.

4. Uninterrupted Transition

The guiding principle concerning maintenance of services throughout the transition process is extremely important. It creates a high level of interdependence among the institutions currently providing services. The NIC will have to work closely with other organizations to carry forward the change process, and after it achieves legal standing the new government will have to work closely with those institutions to ensure adequate service delivery.

This principle requires that change be carefully engineered to ensure all involved know, understand and are willing and able to carry out the roles ascribed to them. In particular, it requires that the Western and Nunavut governments reach mutual agreement on arrangements for continuity of service.

In terms of the legal framework, the need for consultation has been recognized in Part 2 of the Political Accord. It also means that those receiving services must understand what is proposed, and how and when change will occur. The emphasis on local decision making places further emphasis on communication as decisions about service delivery are increasingly localized.

5. Minimize In-Migration

This major principle must be considered in conjunction with the uninterrupted transition mandate. If there is to be no risk of service disruption the "framework" in place before Nunavut undertakes direct administration of a particular service must have a capacity comparable to that already operating in the GNWT.

A key element of this framework is the skill level of the workforce. If in-migration is also to be minimized this skill set must be developed locally. This means the time frames and costs associated with this endeavour become the critical determining factor in any strategy for program transfer. The availability of skilled local staff, and the time needed to ensure this, will drive the process. It also means variation

ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖓ "ᐊᐅᓚᓇᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ" ᒐᕙᒪᑦ ᐅᑉᓗᐊᓂ (ᕿᕐᓂᕐᑎᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᖕ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᒐᒻᒥ 1). ᐊᒻᒪᓗᑕᐅᖕ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓇᔭᕆᕐᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᒐᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᓇᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖓ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ, ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᖕᒐᐅᓗᓂ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᖃᖓᐅᒋᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᓛᒻᒪᖕᑐᓂᒃᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑎᐊᓂᖓᓂᑦ (ᓱᑦᓗ ᓄᓇᓂᑦ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᖓᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᑦ) ᓱᑲᐃᑎᑎᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓐᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖕᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᐃᐅᔭᖕᑐᖕ. ᐃᓕᑕᓇᔭᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᓱᔨᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓴᕿᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᑦ ᑕᕙᖓ ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ "ᓴᖕᓂᖃᕐᓂᖕ ᒪᕈᖕᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᖃᕐᓗᓂ" ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᕐᔭᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᕐᔭᔭᕐᔪᐊᓕᓇᔨᖕᒋᓄᑦ.

ᑲᑐᔨᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖓ ᒪᓕᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᐃᒋᕙᖕᑕᒻᒥᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ.

1 ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᖕᑐᖕ ᐃᓱᒋᓇᔭᖕᑕᖓ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᖕ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ; ᑲᑐᔨᔨᐅᔪᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᖕ ᒪᓕᖕᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ.

2. ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᑕᐅᑐᖓ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑖᓇᓴᐃᓇᐅᒋᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᑐᖕ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᑕᐅᖕ ᐊᑭᒋᒐᔭᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᓇᓴᐅᑎᖕᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᐃᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖕᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓚᐅᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ. ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᖕᑐᖕ ᖃᓄᖕ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖓ ᐊᐃᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ. ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖕᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓴᕿᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᑦ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓱᓗᖕᑖᖕᑦ ᐊᑭᑭᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓴᓇᔨᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐃᖕᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᓚᐅᖕᑐᑦ.

3. ᒪᕈᖕ ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᑲᑎᒐᔭᕐᑑᒃ ᑕᔭᖓᑦ ᐊᐃᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᔨᐅᒐᔭᖕᒋᓚᖕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖕ ᐱᔪᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓗᓂ.

4. ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᑕᐅᑐᖓ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᔭᕐᑐᖕ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᑦ ᐊᔪᖕᒋᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓱᐅᑦᐸᖕᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ.

5. ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑐᕐᑐᐃᕙᖕᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑕᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑕᐅᒐᑎᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᖕ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖕ. ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖕᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᐊᐃᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᓱᑦᓕ ᑕᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᔭᖕᑐᑦ.

6. ᐊᑭᖓ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᑎᑎᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᖕᒋᑎᒋᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᒋᐊᖃᕐᑕᖕᒋᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᑑᓂᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᖑᐊᑦ ᐊᐃᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᔨᒌᖕᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᖑᑎᖕᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᖕᒋᑦ

7. ᖃᓱᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᖑᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᖕ ᒐᕙᒪ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᐸᑎᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᐳᑦ ᒪᓕᖑᓗᒍ

of this policy in any program area will affect the timing of program transfer. Since this is a policy decision, it is largely within the control of the parties involved. The current wording of the Political Accord, requires that the NIC work toward employment of local residents, but specific targets are not set.

Timing of transitions will affect the degree to which in-migration is minimized. The impacts of using a shorter transition period are that:

(i) About 50 fewer local people will be appointed prior to "start-up";

(ii) The availability of trained and experienced personnel may be limited; local people who have settled in the larger Eastern communities may need to be enticed to relocate;

(iii) Training positions within the government may need to be created;

(iv) Training must begin **immediately**; and

(v) A strong recruitment drive in the schools and communities must begin **immediately**.

The major benefit of a longer transition period is that it allows more local people to be recruited, gain experience, and obtain pre-employment vocational training. This should ensure a smoother transition because the people will be better equipped to take charge of this major northern enterprise

6. Reasonable Cost

It is recognized that creation of two governments where one previously existed will involve additional ongoing costs, and that the cost of transition is to be funded as a separate "one time" undertaking. It is also clear that costs are to be reasonable, and managed pursuant to pre-established limits. Part 8 of the Political Accord, indicates that the fiscal framework for transition is to be established prior to the coming into force of enabling legislation. The approach is to be primarily "business as usual", with the transition process to be encompassed, to the greatest extent possible, in the overall cost of governing.

This means that, wherever possible, development and implementation of the transition framework will have to be synchronized with existing service delivery activities. New management systems, such as those in respect of human resources or information technology, cannot be wholly created outside existing ones, but must instead emerge from that which is already in place. This further increases the need for close co-operation and joint planning involving all stakeholders.

7. Distinct Governments

A fundamental principle underlying the structure and the transition process is the equal and separate status of the two northern governments involved. The legal framework and its timing are designed to reaffirm this principle as early as possible. This emphasis has implications for the transition process.

The elected representatives who will form the Government of Nunavut must have, and be perceived as having, direct and meaningful involvement in the design and delivery of the transition process. This means the plan cannot be seen as being "carved in stone" early on in the process: there must be room for meaningful input before and after April 1 1999. Since there must be distinct governments, there is also a "core" group of functions that form a threshold beyond which the new government must pass before it can carry out those activities fundamental to a functioning government in the Canadian context.

For the transition process to provide the needed core functions that will allow the government to take control, the "run-up" to April 1, 1999 must include a wide range of activities. There will be (a) high level strategic activity related to long run program and political agendas underway, and (b) detailed administrative and infrastructure planning and implementation work directed at having specific capacities in

ᐃᖏᕋᑎᐊᕈᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒧᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᐊᕈᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓ.

8. ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖅᑯᓂᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖅᑯᓄᓗ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᑦ, ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖏᓂᑦᑖᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᓚᐅᖏᑐᑦ.

9. ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᓚᐅᖏᑐᑦ.

ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ

ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᐃᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓴᕿᓇᕐᐸᖏᒻᒪᖅᒪᑕ ᐊᕕᕐᓱᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑖᑯᓄᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑎᓄᑦ. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐅᖅᑲᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ. ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᓯᔾᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᕕᒋᔭᒻᒥᖅᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᔭᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᒻᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᕋᓇᔪᒻᒪᔭᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒍᒻᒪᔭᖏᓄᑦ.

ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᓕᑕᓇᔭᐅᖏᔪᖅ. ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᕕᖅᖅᒪᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᕕᖅᐃᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ.

ᐊᒻᒪᐅᒋᔭᑕᐅᖅ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑐᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ. ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᓂᖏᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᒐᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ, ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᓗᔭᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᓱᔾᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᒻᒥᒃ, ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓱᐊᒍᖓᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ.

ᑖᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᑲᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓴᒧᖓᕐᑕᐅᕙᖅ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᒋᑎᐊᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑖᓱᒥᖓᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᑐᕋᖓᕕᖅᑲᕋᓱᐊᕐᓱᑕ. ᐅᔾᕈᓱᖕᐳᒍᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐃᓇᐅᔭᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᔪᒻᒪᔭᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᑎᒋᓱᒻᒪᔭᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᓱᒻᒪᔭᕐᑦ, ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᔪᒍᑦ ᐅᖅᑐᕋᕐᓱᒻᒪᔭᕐᑦ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᓇᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒍ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖑᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᕐᑦ ᒪᓕᒃᓱᒍ ᐃᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓱᒻᒪᖅᒪᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᐅᒃ ᑕᕙᖅᓗ ᓱᓕᑎᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᖅᑎᒋᖅᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᔪᓴᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᓱᑎᒃ.

ᐅᖅᑲᑎᒋᔪᒻᒪᔭᕐᑦ ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᒋᑎᐊᓚᐅᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᓴᖓᕕᖅᑲᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᓚᒪᖅ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐅᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐱᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᕕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓱᑎᒃ. ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᕕᒋᓚᐅᕐᐸᖏᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑎᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑭᖑᕙᕐᐸᒐᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖑᔭᕙᖅᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᔪᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᖅ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᐱᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖓ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᖓᑕ.

place on designated dates. The process must encompass and facilitate both.

8. Major Strategic Decisions

Although much transfer activity will not occur until later stages in the transition process (Phases Four and Five in Exhibit 3), many decisions made in the early stages will have a major impact on long term service delivery. The choice of a platform for information technology, the framework for addressing long range employee benefits, the underlying style and principles for drafting legislation, or the basic strategy for delivery of a class of programs, are examples of decisions that will have long lasting effects. This means that although detailed implementation planning for some program sectors will not occur until later on, the early stages of the transition process must include strategic consideration of the full spectrum of contemplated activities to ensure that decisions of this type are made with an awareness of the full breadth of their implications.

9. Minimum Capacity

It is important that the new government have the capacity to undertake its role effectively in respect of its citizens and other governments and institutions. The scope of policy issues and challenges the organization will face will parallel those of comparable governments. From the point of legal accountability onward, given the distinct legal status of the government, it must have the basic minimum capacity to govern effectively. The lengthened transition process costed as a feasible option in this study assumes the organization design proposed in this report is adopted. Under these arrangements it is possible to operate with the staff complement indicated for start-up in 1999. **A major change in the organization design would require a re-evaluation of the suitability of this complement.**

THE STAGES IN THE PROCESS

Overall, the suggested transition process acknowledges the need to first develop the basic infrastructure for the NIC, in particular bringing into the organization the senior level planning, administration and negotiating skills needed to develop the details of the process and the basic framework for creation of a new government.

This initial challenge is then followed by an extensive planning and information gathering phase, which leads to development of the core functions, and creation of the bridging mechanisms for the other functions that will follow.

The remaining stages are a repeated cycle of preparation for, and then transfer of, programs from the bridging mechanism to the Government of Nunavut. This "rhythm of transfer" is designed to support the "minimize risk" and "minimize in-migration" directives in particular.

It is also in harmony with the organization's program groups set out in Chapter 3, and outlined in detail in Appendix D.

The timeframes set out for each Phase reflect calendar years, and overall feasibility at the time of this study. Actual timeframes may differ in response to influences not known at this time, or to the requirements of fiscal year planning. The proportion of overall transition time devoted to each stage should, however, remain as outlined.

PHASE 1 -- January 1992 To December 1992 - Establish N.I.C.

This stage covers the year during which the NIC is appointed pursuant to the Nunavut Act. The objective is to create the NIC and put in place a basic administrative structure for its

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ᓄᑖᖅ ᑕᑯᔾᔾᐅᔪᖅ - ᐊᐱᕐᒥᑎ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ

ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ

ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᑯᑦ 2 ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑕ ᐅᓂᒃᑯᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ C ᐊᒻᒪᓗ D.

ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓚᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᒪᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄᑦ, ᑕᐃᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᐊᒋᓚᓇᖅᑕᖓᓂᒃ, ᓱᕋᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ. ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᖏᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕙᓕ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᐊᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᑯᑕᓕᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᖏᒍᒻᒥᑐᒻᒥᒃ D-1 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ D-2. ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᑎᑦ, ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᓴᑲᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ, ᓱᓂᕐᑕᐅᓇᑎᒃ, ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐱᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᖅᓱᑎᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᖏᓂᖏᑦ (ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᒥᑭᑑᓗᐊᓚᐅᕐᒪᑕ ᐃᖅᒥᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐊᖏᓂᒃ), ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓕᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᑎᓄᑦ, ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᓄᖃᐅᔭᐅᔭᖏᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ.

ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓴᕿᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᑎᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ (ᐅᐃᒍ B), ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓕᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᓗᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔪᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ. ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᖃᕐᔭᖅ ᒪᕈᖅᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᔪᖅᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᓗᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐅᖃᐅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ:

1. ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᖑᔪᑦ ᒪᕙᒪᑯᓂ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂ ᑐᖅᓕᖏᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ: ᐱᑕᖃᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᑦ ᑐᖅᓕᖏᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᖃᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᑯᓕᖑᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ. ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᕕᐅᖏᒪᑕ ᐊᑕᓇᓇᖅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᑦ ᑐᖅᓕᐊ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ. ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᓇᖅᒥᓂᖅ ᐱᕕᖃᕈᓇᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᐅᓂᓴᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖅᑐᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᑎᑎᕙᒍᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓕᔪᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᓇᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᕕᑎᒋᔭᖓᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᐃᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑕ. ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᐅᔪᑦ ᑭᐅᔪᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᒥᖅᓴᓗᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᕐᓴᑎᒻᒥᓂ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᓗᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᑭᐊᕐᕕᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᓗᒍᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕐᓴᔾᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᓗ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᖅᐱᑭᕐᕕᐅᑎᑎᔪᓇᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓴᖅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᖓᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᔪᓇᖅᓗᑎᑦ.

operations, and recruit an executive director and selected other senior level staff to begin the process of creating the overall development plan. These senior people should be seen as clearly responsible for the process of managing the development of specific program groups. They should be established at the deputy minister level.

This stage includes preparation of preliminary communications material, and commencement of preliminary discussions with GNWT on a wide range of issues including possible transfer or sharing of key staff, and arrangements for starting the process of dividing assets, creating service delivery bridging agreements and ensuring minimization of in-migration. Development of a data base on which to build a preliminary human resources plan would occur during this period.

An important part of this stage is development of a shared understanding of longer term expectations between the senior staff of NIC and MLA's from the Nunavut area. This is necessary to ensure that initial planning and negotiations undertaken in the next stage accurately reflect the views of political decision makers. A formal mechanism should be established to ensure a meaningful on-going link between the activities of the NIC and the MLA's of Nunavut.

PHASE 2 - January 1993 To December 1993 - Detailed Planning

Although actual program transfers, beyond core functions, will not occur until well past April 1999, the interdependence of many services requires that all be considered initially as part of an overall approach. Some administrative dimensions of service delivery, such as the legislative framework, and the information and human resource management strategies, span all programs. Effective long term strategies in these areas, which affect both Nunavut and GNWT, must be developed with an appreciation of overall intentions. Some decisions about program delivery mechanisms, especially concerning capital and human resource needs, will have to be considered at this stage to ensure that the long development cycles involved do not delay transfer of services in later stages of the process.

For "core" services this stage involves detailed planning for provision of full service on April 1 1999. Human resource, information technology, legislative and capital issues must be addressed in detail. The objective is to have, by the end of the phase, an extremely detailed plan that will set out exactly how full operations for "core" functions are to be achieved. This plan should set out deliverables to at least the monthly level for the period January 1 1994 to April 1 1999. This process should be carried out in three stages. Stage one would involve developing a draft plan. Stage two would be consultation with those necessarily involved in implementation. Stage three would be refinement of the plan followed by approval by the NIC.

For the other two program groupings (Education, Culture, Capital Works and Northern Development in Phase Four and Social Services and Health in Phase Five) this stage will involve meeting two separate needs. The first priority is to begin the process of putting in place the arrangements for service continuity in these areas beyond April 1, 1999. A less important but linked consideration is to begin setting out the process for transfer of administrative activity to employees of Nunavut, where appropriate.

Getting ready for the service continuity challenge involves several stages within this phase.

(i) Strategy Development - Before approaching GNWT or other organizations regarding service maintenance or transfer arrangements, the NIC must initially clarify its own overall needs and preferences. Although the desirability or achievability of these preferences may be altered significantly by subsequent events, it is important that interaction with other stakeholders not occur until this preliminary step is completed.

2. ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒥᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᖅᓱᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓱᑕᒻᒪᐅᖕᒪᑕ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕝᕙᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᖅᓂᐊᖅᐸᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᐊᒻᒥᐅᖃᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᒐᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᔪᖕᓇᖏᑎᑎᓗᓂ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕆᐊᖅᐸᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᖅᑐᓂᒃ. ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᖅᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᔭᖅ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᑕᖅᐸᓕᐊᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᖅᓱᓂ ᐊᖏᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔪᓇᖅᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓈᒻᒪᑎᐊᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐅᑐᕆᑲᔭᖅᑕᖓᓂᒃ. ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓂᖅ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᐅᓂᐊᖅᐸᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔨᐅᕙᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᓄᑦ ᑕᕙᓂ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑉ ᑐᓐᓕᐊᑕ ᐊᖅᒪᖅᕕᖓᓂ, ᓱᖅᓗ, ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᖅᒪᑦ ᐊᑲᐅᓂᖅᐸᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᓂᖅᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᖅᐸᐅᔪᑦ ᐸᐃᑦᑕᑦ ᓱᖅᓗ ᑐᐸᐅᑎᖅᐸᐃᑦ ᐋᖅᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖅᑕᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᓱᖅᑎᐅᔪᖅᐸᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᑦ.

ᐊᑐᖅᓇᖅᐳᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᑑᓂᖓ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑖᓱᒻᒪ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᖅᐸᐅᑉ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐅᓄᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᐸᖅᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓗᐊᔭᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᖅᖅ ᐊᖅᑕᐅᑎᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐅᓚᓐᓂᑦ ᖃᓕᕆᖅᑐᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᒌᑎᐊᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᖅᐳᑦ. ᐋᖅᑕᐅᓚᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᓂᐅᓂᐊᕋᓱᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑭᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᖅᑕᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᒋᐊᖃᖅᐳᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᐊᕈᓇᖅᓗᒍ ᑕᕝᕙᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ..

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᑯᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᐃᒍ ᐅ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖅᒪᑦ, ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᓂᐊᖅᑐᑉ ᐋᖅᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓱᕐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᓗᓂᔪᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᔨᐅᔪᑦ, ᐱᕕᐅᖕᒍᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓱᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑉ ᑐᓐᓕᐊᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᖕᒍᓗᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ, ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᖅᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᑎᖅᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᕐᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑭᓱᓗᖅᑕᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᖕᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖅᑕᐅᑎᐊᑲᓂᖅᓂᖕᒥᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓱᒋᐊᖑᔾᔨᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐊᔪᖕᓂᑦ ᐱᕈᖅᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᖅᓂᐊᖅᓂᖅᒧᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᕕᐅᖅᒥᖕᒪᑦ ᐅᖕᐱᖅᓇᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᖅᓂᐊᖅᓂᖏᓄᑦ. ᐊᑕᐅᓱᐅᒐᔭᖅᐳᖅ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᑉ ᑐᓐᓕᐊ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᓕᕆᔨᐅᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᖅᓗᓕ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ.

ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖅᒧᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ

ᐊᖅᑭᖅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖅᖅ ᐅᖕᐱᓇᔭᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖅᒧᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᓂᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᔪᓇᓇᐊᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᖅᓕᒋᐊᖅᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᑭᐅᑎᐊᕈᓇᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᖅᑭᑎᐊᖅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᓱᖅᓕᐅᖑᔭᖏᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑦ. ᑐᓴᐅᑎᓄᑦ ᓴᓇᕈᑏᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᓕᒋᐊᖅᑎᑎᔪᓇᖅᒪᑕ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᐅᑎᑭᖅᓂᖅᒥᒃ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᑉ ᑐᓐᓕᖏᑦ, (ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕋᔭᖏᓕᑦ ᖃᓕᕆᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᖅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒐᔪᖃᑉ ᑐᓐᓕᖏᑦ). ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᖅᑐᑦ

(ii) Exploratory Talks - Before commencing any detailed discussions or negotiations, NIC should hold preliminary or exploratory talks with a number of institutions, in particular the GNWT. Consideration might also be given to undertaking joint information gathering to provide further information to all parties. This will permit clarification and enhancement of available options and support further refinement of objectives.

(iii) Strategy Refinement - Completion of items (i) and (ii) will permit further refinement of an overall strategy for dealing with service continuity and transfer issues. It will also allow all stakeholders to refine their positions based on a greater appreciation of the needs and aspirations of others, and a common understanding of the most important facts.

(iv) Detailed Planning - The refined strategy is then turned into a detailed plan. This plan will drive the negotiations with other organizations deemed important to service continuity and transfer. The plan will have to be altered to reflect the results of negotiations, but if the information and "intelligence" gathered in parts (i) to (iii) of this process are accurate the plan should form a solid platform for commencing negotiations. There should not be any major surprises for stakeholders.

PHASE 3 - January 1994 To April 1999 - Core Building And Consultation

The overall objective for this period is to turn the plans developed and refined in Phase Two into realities. At the end of the period there should be in place an operational "core", and arrangements assuring continuation of services beyond April 1, 1999, in a fashion supported by stakeholders.

Three activities dominate this period of time (see Exhibit 3). In respect of "core" functions, the detailed plan developed in Phase Two is carried out. For other functions activity is divided into two stages.

First the planned approach to service maintenance and transfer is used as the basis for consultation within Nunavut. Before commencing detailed negotiations key community leaders of the region must understand the overall approach and its implications for the type and costs of services delivered. In response to this consultation process there may be further refinement of needs and objectives.

This first step is followed by the process of negotiating arrangements with the organizations targeted through the analysis and consultation process. GNWT will be a major participant, but it is possible others will also be involved.

The detailed procedures for putting in place the bridging arrangements will be developed in accordance with plans put together in Phase Two, and the feedback obtained in the consultation portion of this phase. In any case, we recommend that the parties target late Fall of 1997, and possibly earlier where arrangements require long "run up" initiatives such as is needed for human resources, as the point at which program bridging arrangements should be established.

PHASE 4 - April 1999 To 2004 Implementation And Program Transfer

The objective for this phase is to implement the core functions and complete the transfer of medium term programs. This process will involve designing handoff procedures acceptable to affected parties and ensuring suitable infrastructure exists to receive the administrative responsibilities involved.

At the beginning of this phase, the new government becomes legally responsible for all service delivery.

PHASE 5 - 2004 To 2008 - Program Transfer

The objective here is to carry out the transfer of remaining programs. The development process is completed at the end of this stage.

ᐊᐱᕐᓱᐊᖅᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑕᐅᔪᓐᓂᕐ ᐱᑎᑕᐅᑎᐊᕈᓐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᖕᒐ ᐱᑎᑎᔪᓐᒪᑦ ᓱᓕᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᓴᕐᓱᐅᕈᓐᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ D, ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᓴᖕᒐᕐᑲᓇᓘᓇᕐᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᓐᕐᑕᒻᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖅᑲᕐᓗᓂ ᐅᐃᒍᒋᖕᒪᒍ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ; ᐊᑕᐅᓱᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖅᑲᕋᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᕕᐅᒍᓴᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ, ᑕᕝᕙᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᖅ ᐃᑲᒧᕐᓱᕐᕕᖅᓴᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒥ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐸᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖕᒋᑎᑎᓂᕐᓴᐅᓇᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᕕᒋᐊᖕᒋᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᓐᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ. ᐊᕐᕕᖕᒋᑎᑎᓂᕐᓴᐅᓇᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂ, ᑕᕝᕙᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᖅ ᐃᑲᒧᕐᓱᕐᕕᖅᓴᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒥ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐸᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖕᒋᑎᑎᓂᕐᓴᐅᓇᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᕕᒋᐊᖕᒋᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᓐᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ.

ᓇᐃᖕᓕᒋᐊᕐᓱᒋᑦ

ᐅᖕᐱᕈᓱᖕᔭᒍᑦ ᑖᓱᒻᒪ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᖅ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖕᕋᑎᐊᕈᓴᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᓐᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᓱᕝᓕᐅᔭᐅᕐᖑᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᑭᒐᕐᑐᐃᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ. ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕐᖅ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᖅᑎᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐅᖅᑲᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ, ᑭᓱᐊᒥᓂ ᓱᑦᓕ ᐲᕐᑕᐅᓕᕆᖅᓱᒻᒪᖕᑐᑦ, ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᖕᒐᕐᑕᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕝᖕᒐ ᐊᔭᐅᓇᔭᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᒧᖕᒐᕐᑎᑕᐅᖑᔭᐅᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᓴᕐᓱᐅᕈᓐᓂᖅ, ᑭᐅᕕᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᐃᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓴᖕᒐᕐᓱᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᖕᓂ ᓱᕝᓕᖕᓂ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑭᖕᓴᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ, ᐱᑕᖃᓇᕝᕕᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᖕᓱᔪᓂᖅ ᐃᖕᕋᑎᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᖅ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ.

3. ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖅ - ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᖃᓱᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖕᒐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᖕᒥᑯᓕᖕᒐᓗᓂ ᑲᓇᖕᓇᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓗᓂ, ᐊᕿᖕᓱᕈᑎᐊᖃᕋᑕ ᐊᕿᖕᒐᔭᐅᔪᓂᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᖅ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᐃᓚᐅᕐᒪᑎᑐᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐᑐᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑉ, **ᐊᑕᐅᓱᕐᑕᖃᖕᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᕿᒍᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᑖᓱᒻᒧᖕᒐ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᑐᒻᒧᑦ, ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓱᖅ ᐅᖕᒐᑖᓄᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖕᒐᕈᓐᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᐃᐅᖕᒐᓗᑎᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖕᒐᔪᑦ.** ᐊᖕᒐᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᒻᒥ 3 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕝᕙᓇ ᐅᓂᑲᓇᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔭᐅᓂᖕᒋᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᓱᔨᕐᐸᑦ, ᐊᖑᑎᒋᔭᖕᒐᓕ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᓱᔨᓇᐊᖃᕋᔭᕐᖅ.

ᑖᑯᑎᒍᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᕐᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐃᓱᒪᒻᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᒋᓱᔪᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᓕᒻᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᖕᕋᕐᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᐃᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ.

ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓕᓇᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓱᔨᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ

THE ORDER OF FUNCTIONAL TRANSFER

The proposed transition process sets out administrative transfer in three stages: (i) Core Functions; (ii) Education, Culture, Capital Works and Northern Development; and (iii) Health and Social Services.

The core functions cover those activities essential to the political and executive functions of government in Canada. For example, Nunavut could not be a government without a functioning legislative assembly. Appendix D sets out the framework developed for and used by the stakeholders to determine which functions were to be treated as core functions. The order of transfer for remaining functions (see (ii) and (iii) above) was designed to acknowledge the following influences.

1. In-migration

The directive to minimize in-migration can be effectively implemented only through the manipulation of transfer points to accommodate the local availability of qualified persons emerging from the human resource development system. Programs involving extensive qualifications to occupy senior positions will require longer time frames to program transfer. The time frames are determined by the limitations and time requirements of the training process.

2. Maximize Discretion

Those elected to govern Nunavut will want to influence the design and delivery of high profile programs within the region, such as education and health care. Where possible, the timing of transfer has been positioned to permit representatives to have direct influence over the manner, timing and substance of program transfer and delivery.

3. Division of Assets

The process of dividing the assets associated with some of these programs will take some time and should be carried out in conjunction with other decision making surrounding program transfer. Where the program is complex, and the assets not easily divisible, timing should recognize this reality.

4. Legal Frameworks

If there are to be any adjustments to the legal framework for some of the more broadly based or complex programs, this should occur before any transfer. This avoids having to make two separate adjustments, legal and administrative, in relation to the transfer. It also ensures compatibility of legal and administrative systems. The process should reflect the time needed to accomplish this, and the reality that a functioning legislature is needed to do so.

5. Integrity of Program Groupings

To avoid a state of almost constant transfer activity, it is more effective to carry out transfers in packages that parallel the program groupings outlined in the organization design. This means that the optimum point of transfer will be determined by the "slowest" of the programs contained in the package. For example, if the greatest challenges in the Social Services/Health Care group flow from Health Care, then the speed at which these are addressed will determine the timing of transfer.

6. Impact on the GNWT

There are two governments involved in this process. Transfer of programs will affect both, especially for larger programs. The "donor" government needs to have time to develop its own strategies for handling the human resource and expenditure implications of the transfer, especially where it has been continuing service delivery during the transfer process. The stresses being created through the reorganization of the GNWT must also be acknowledged. Rapid transfer of programs while this process is underway would

ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᓐᓕᐊᕕᒋᔭᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ B, ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᐅᖕᒪᑕ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᔾᔪᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᑭᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᖕ ᑭᖑᓕᕆᔨᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ.

1. ᓇᔪᒐᐅᔪᖕ ᒪᓂᕋᑐᖕ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᓄᑖᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᑲᓇᖕᓇᒻᒥ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᕈᕐᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᑭᐅᔪᑎᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᖕᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᕈᐅᒐᓂ, ᐃᖃᐅᒻᒪᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᐳᖕ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐃᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᖕᒪᑕ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᒻᒥ ᑕᒻᒪᑐᒻᒪᓂ. ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᕙᖕᐳᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᐅᑏᑦ ᐱᑎᑕᐅᔭᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ. ᐊᒻᒥᓱᐃᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᖓ ᑐᑭᖃᕐᐳᖕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᓴᖓᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᐳᖕ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᑑᖏᑐᖕ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ "ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᓚᕆᖕᑕᖓᓂᑦ", ᑭᓯᐊᓂᖓᑦᓕ ᓱᑲᐃᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᒪᕈᖕᓂᒃ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑑᖕᓂᒃ ᑕᕙᖓᑦ ᓴᐅᓂᖓᓂᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᒻᒥᑦ. ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓴᕿᔭᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᓄᑖᒍᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᔭᕆᑦᓗᓂ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂᖓᑦᓕ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᕕᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖕ ᐅᑭᐅᑦᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ.

2. ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ

ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᖕᓗ ᐃᓂᒻᒥᖕᓂ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᓴᖓᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᖏᑐᖕ ᓱᑲᖓᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᕐᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᒥᓱᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᓂᒋᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓂᑭᑖᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓄᑖᒻᒥ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂᖓᑦᓕ, ᓴᐅᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᕙᓗᑎᑦ ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᖏᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓗ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓕᓇᒍᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᖕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᑖᕙᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᒻᒪᓗᓂ ᓴᕿᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ.

ᐃᖕᒥᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ, ᓄᑖᖕ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᑕᐃᑯᐊᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᑕᕐᓂᑯᖕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ, ᐱᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓈᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᒻᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᑕ. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᒌᑎᐊᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᐳᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᕋᓇᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᖑᓗᒍ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ ᐊᕿᖕᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᔪᖏᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᐳᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᔭᖓᓂ.

undermine the directive for a low risk transfer.

7. Information and Communication

There is a strongly expressed preference for extensive communication and education activity before significant change is undertaken. Since the grouping of programs is being changed during transfer, this process could take some time; familiar service packages will be changing significantly.

This transfer process is designed to accommodate these requirements to the greatest extent possible. It is designed in particular to support the collaborative approach taken in the Political Accord.

ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑭᓕᕆᔨᓯᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᓇᖅᓂᕐᕗᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᓕᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᓱᓂᑦᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᑕᕝᕗ ᐃᓚᖓᑎᒍᑦ 6 ᑕᓯᒻᒪ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒋᑎᒻᒥᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑭᓕᕆᔨᓯᕐᓂᑦᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ 9-ᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, 6-ᓯᐅᔪᑦ "ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓇᔪᒃᓚᑦ" "ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᓇᖅᒥᓂᑦᑕᕐᕕᐅᔪᒻᒥ". ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑭᐅᒃᓯᐊᕐᓯᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐃᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᔾᔨᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᐳᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕝᕗ "ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ". ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᓛᕐᑐᑦ, ᐊᕿᖅᓱᒪᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᕕᑎᖅᓴᖓ "ᓱᕈᓕᕐᔪᖅ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᓯᓂᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ".

ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᑎᐊᕈᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᑕᖅᒪᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ, ᐱᓱᒪᖅᓯᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᖅᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᑏᑎᐊᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᕐ, ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᑯᓄᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᕐᑕᕐᑎᑕᐅᖃᑕᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᑕᑯᐊ ᒪᕈᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᕐᖅᓂᐊᕐᕐᒃ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᓕᖏᒥ 6 ᑕᕝᕗ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒋᑎᑯᑦ. ᑎᓕᔭᐅᔪᑎᒋᓚᐅᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑭᐅᒃᓯᐊᕐᓯᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᕕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑯᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ, ᐱᔪᑎᖏᓂᒃ, ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᒋᐊᖃᕐᑕᖏᓂᒃ, ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᓕᑕᓇᓗᓂᔪᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᕕᖅᓴᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᑐᐃᓇᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕕᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᕝᕗ ᐊᕐᕌᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᒍᑦ.

3. ᒪᓕᒐᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᓗ

ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑎᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔾᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓇᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᑦ.

ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔾᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓇᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᑦ.

ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔾᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᑦ "ᐊᕿᑎᐅᔪᑦ" ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖏᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ. ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᐅᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᖓᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓇᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒻᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᕙᖓᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᕙᖓᑕ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᑯᓂ. ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᓕ ᓴᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᖓᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓱᕐᓗ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖓᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ (ᑎᑭᓱᒍ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᑎᑕᐅᓯᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᑎᑭᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ), ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᑐᓴᕈᑏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᖅᑎᑦᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓄᖓᑦᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ.

4. CREATING AND OPERATING THE GOVERNMENT

Chapter 3 set out the proposed transition process for creating a fully operational government. This chapter presents the human and financial resource impacts of employing a three- or five-phase transition process.

Exhibit 4 contains summary information about person years, costs, and revenues. For each category shown in the left-most column, the two right-most columns indicate either a person year value or a dollar value for a transition process that is to be completed by 1999, or 2008. The details that support this information are found in Appendix F. Exhibit F-2 addresses the 1999 scenario and Exhibit F-4 addresses the 2008 scenario. The logic, assumptions, values, and methodology used to generate the results appearing in Appendix F are fully explained in Appendix E.

The information presented in Exhibit 4 has been grouped into estimated person years, annual costs of full operations and annual revenues.

PERSON YEARS, COSTS AND REVENUES

Person Years

The total staff complement required to operate the government is estimated to be 1,636 person years, regardless of which transition scenario is employed. The regional requirement remains as is at 706 person years. The headquarters requirement, which is incremental, is 930 person years.

Of those employed at headquarters over four fifths will be recruited from outside the immediate area. A longer transition period results in more local residents being hired because they will have more opportunity to receive the training needed to fill available positions. The net effect is that, under a shortened transition scenario, 129 positions will be filled by locally-hired candidates. This number increases to 177 under a lengthened transition scenario.

The relationship between the total Nunavut local-hire representation and that found at each job category in the organization is also indicated. A full 60% of the executive and 42% of the senior administrator positions are filled locally in the shortened scenario, while the percentages are 75% and 40%, respectively, for a lengthened transition.

A lengthened transition allows for more hiring of local residents, and a greater proportion of senior administration positions filled by local residents.

(Related Exhibits: E-1, E-4, E-8, E-13, F-2 and F-4).

A second scenario based on a very aggressive recruitment and training strategy, during a lengthened transition, was undertaken. By increasing the local hire representation at the support (to 50%), Officer (to 51%), Mid-level (to 40%), and Senior (to 52%) job categories the number of positions filled locally could reach 460.5. Given this estimated high demand for local human resources and the more extensive training and experience requirements in headquarter level positions, a very focused and energetic campaign will be required in order to have half the positions in Nunavut filled locally.

Only the associated training costs for this second scenario have been provided as a local hire representation of 177 is deemed more conservative and prudent.

(Related Exhibit: F-5).

ᑕᐃᓱᒻᒪᓂ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999 ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᕿᓴᕐᕕᖅᑭᓇᓱᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔪᕿᓂᖓ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᓴᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒻᒥ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᑐᖅ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᖅᓗᓂ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐱᕈᕐᐸᓕᐊᖑᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᐸᖅᑕᖓᑦ ᐱᓱᒻᒪᖅᓱᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᓱᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᕐᓂᐊᕐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑕᐅᓇᖏᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᖃᓴᐃᔭᕐᑎᖏᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᐊᔪᕿᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓱᐅᕈᑎᓄᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᐸᖅᓂᖅᒧᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑎᐊᕐᔪᖅ ᑖᑯᓄᖓᑐᐊᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ.

4. ᐅᓇᕕᓴᐃᔭᖏᑐᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖅ

ᒪᓕᖅᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓕᓇᖅᐳᖅ. ᐊᕿᖅᓱᖅᒪᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓕᓇᖅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖅᑐᑦ. ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓱᑎᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᖃᑎᐊᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓱᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᖓᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᓇᖏᕐᓱᖅᐸᑦ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᖃᑎᐊᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᐳᖅ ᐊᕿᒋᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᖓᓗᒋᑦ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᑎᑎᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᖑᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑕᐃᑯᐊᓗᖅᑖᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔾᔾᒪᖑᓗᒋᑦ, ᑐᑭᓱᐅᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᕿᐊᓱᒐᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᖓᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᖓᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ. ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒋᐊᖃᕐᖅ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᑎᒋᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓱᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑕ ᓄᖅᐅᔭᐅᖓᓇᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ.

ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᐅᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ, ᐊᐱᕐᓱᕐᐸᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓕᑕᓇᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑐᖅᓕᐊᓂ 2 ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ. ᐃᒻᒪᓇᑕᐅᖅ ᑐᑭᖃᓇᕗᖅ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᑐᑭᓱᒻᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓇᐅᖅᒪᖓᑦ ᑐᖅᓱᕋᐅᑕᐅᔪᖅ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖓ ᐊᓱᔾᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓱᐅᕈᓇᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓕᓱᑲᓂᓇᕗᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᐅᑎᕙᖅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓱᐅᕐᓂᕐᓄᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓄᖅᓴᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

5. ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᑎᓇᓱᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᖅᓴᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᑦ

ᑖᓇ ᐊᕿᔪᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓱᐅᕐᕕᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᖅ ᐊᑕᓗᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑦ ᐅᓇᕕᓴᐃᓚᑎᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᒧᑦ. ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑕᐅᔭᖏᐸᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ "ᓴᐅᓂᖅᓴᖅ" ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᓇᖅᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᓚᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᖏᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᔪᖏᑎᒋᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᖅ ᐃᖏᕐᔪᓇᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑏᖅᑐᑎᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᑎᑐᑦ.

Annual Cost Of Full Operations

Annual expenditures are estimated to be 620 million dollars under either transition scenario. Regional spending of 233 million dollars accounts for 38%, and headquarter spending of 387 million dollars accounts for the remaining 62%. Of the latter, the capital portion has been fixed at 75 million dollars, while the balance, 312 million dollars, represents operating costs. The operating cost estimate for Program functions of 134 million dollars is higher than that of Agency functions of 102 million dollars, and more than double that of Core functions of 63 million dollars. The remaining 12 million dollars goes toward the operations and maintenance of the infrastructure.

The Core functions, the Program Delivery functions, and the Agency functions ultimately deliver the same level of service under either transition scenario. Also, under either transition scenario, the same government infrastructure is ultimately required. Therefore, annual capital, operating, and maintenance cost estimates for these items are the same in both cases.

However, under the shortened scenario, more community infrastructure is required to support the larger population caused by a greater degree of in-migration. Therefore, where transition ends in 1999, it will cost the government about 340 thousand dollars more annually to operate and maintain the community infrastructure.

(Related Exhibits: E-1, E-2, E-3, E-9 to E-19, F-2 and F-4).

Annual Revenues

Current sources and amounts of revenues are assumed to remain intact under both transition scenarios. Annual revenues are about 295 million dollars, with about 15% coming from Core Functions, 55% from Program Functions, and 30% from Agency Functions. Since the baseline data indicated no revenues being generated in the regions, regional revenues are assumed to be nil.

(Related Exhibits: E-1, E-20, F-2 and F-4).

INCREMENTAL COSTS

Exhibit 5 highlights only those costs that arise as a result of setting up a new government. These are costs that would not exist if a new Nunavut government were not created. This estimate does not provide the net incremental cost to the Government of Canada for servicing all regions of the Northwest Territories because this study does not take into account potential savings that will result when the GNWT is reorganized.

New, additional costs associated with the establishment of the Nunavut Government, have been identified. Those that will be incurred only once, and those that will be repeated year after year, have been identified separately.

One Time Incremental Costs Incurred Prior To Full Operations

These costs arise only during the transition years, as the government is being "built". Once all aspects of the government have been put in place, this "seed money" will no longer be required. Expenditures that fall in this category include all costs associated with activities that are purely transitional (i.e. training of locally hired appointments, recruitment and settlement of non-local hires initially required to fill the new positions, transition management, legislation development, forms and supplies, computer operations support, software modification, and office accommodations), plus the cost of building the government and community infrastructure.

Total one-time costs range from 334 to 340 million dollars. The shortened transition period costs about 6 million dollars more than the lengthened transition period. The difference arises because more people are recruited from outside Iqaluit under the shortened transition

ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᐊᕐᐸᐅᒃ ᑖᓱᒻᒪ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᐊᕿᖅᓱᒻᒪᓂᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᐊᔪᖏᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᐅᔪᑦᑕᕝᕕᓕ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᐸᑕ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᐳᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᒻᒥᐅᑕᐃᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᖃᖓᐅᓚᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖓ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᕐᐸᐅᓕᕐᐳᖅ ᐱᔪᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᒐᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ, ᐊᖑᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᓂᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᓗ ᐊᔾᑏᖏᓂᖏᑦ ᑖᓱᒻᒪ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᒐᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᒐᕐᓱᐅᕈᑕᐅᖕᒪᑦ, ᐊᖏᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓗᐊᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᖏᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᐃᑦ. ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖏᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᐅᑦ, ᐱᑎᑎᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᒥᐅᑕᓂᒃ. ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᑐᕋᓇᔭᐅᓚᓇᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᖏᑐᑦ.

ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᓱᐊᓂᕐᒥᐅᑕᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕿᐊᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᑎᑕᐅᓚᓱᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ. ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᓱᓂ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᖓᓂ ᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ:

(i) ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖓᓂ 50 ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ, "ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓂᐊᑕ";

(ii) ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᕐᐸᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᕕᓂᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ; ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᒻᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᓂ ᑲᓇᖕᓇᒻᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᓂ ᓄᖕᑎᕈᒻᒪᑎᑕᐅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ;

(iii) ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᖓᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ;

(iv) ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᐳᖅ Lacᓇᒃ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ

(v) ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓇᓱᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᓂᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᓇᐊᖃᓕᕐᐳᖅ Lacᓇᒃ.

ᐊᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᐸᑦ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖓ ᐱᑎᑎᑲᓂᕋᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᖓᕐᓗᑎᒃ. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᓕᐅᕐᓱᒻᒪᓂᕐᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑎᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐸᑦ ᓱᐊᖕᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᑎᐊᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᖃᑎᐊᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᓕᕋᔭᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓂᕐᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕈᓇᕐᓱᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑐᒻᒥᖓ ᐊᖏᔪᒥᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᑦᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ.

6. ᖃᓄᐃᓗᐊᖏᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ

scenario, driving up the need for more community infrastructures.

Other Incremental Costs Incurred Prior to Full Operations in 2008

In addition to one-time costs, the government will spend incremental dollars on expenses that recur year after year. The total outlay for recurring expenses between 1992 and 2008, inclusive, is 911 million dollars for a transition completed in 1999 and 520 million dollars for a transition completed in 2008. Effectively, 391 million additional dollars will be spent on incremental recurring costs between 2000 and 2008, if transition is completed by 1999. This is because the cost drivers are introduced sooner: facilities are built earlier, Core Functions are operable sooner, and recruitment is accelerated.

Included in this category is the cost of operating and maintaining capital infrastructures, which is higher when transition is completed by 1999 because infrastructures are built sooner and maintained for a longer period. For example, under the shortened transition operating and maintenance costs total 110 million dollars by 2008, or 31 million dollars more than the outlay required under a lengthened transition scenario. Another example is that it costs about 6 million dollars more, by 2008, to operate and maintain the government infrastructure because construction is completed earlier under the shortened transition.

(Related Exhibits: E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-18, E-19; E-1, E-2, E-3, E-15, E-16, E-17; F-2 and F-3).

Another expense in this category is the net cost of running the Core Functions which, at 251 million dollars by 2008 under the shortened scenario, amounts to twice as much as under the lengthened scenario.

Also included are costs associated with the Wildlife Management Board, the Water Management Board, the Land Use Planning Commission and the Impact Review Board. Since the activities of these organizations begin in 1999 under both transition scenarios, the cumulative expense (44 million dollars) is the same in each case.

The last type of expense in this category is the headquarters payroll and personnel cost related to the Program Functions (Northern Development; Capital Works; Education and Culture; Social Service and Health). Between 1992 and 2008, this expense amounts to 475 million dollars under the shortened transition scenario and 248 million dollars under the lengthened scenario. The difference is because programs, and the people needed to deliver them, are brought on stream sooner under the shortened scenario. The amounts shown represent the payroll and personnel proportion of total program cost. The proportion used for the aggregate is the same as for a typical year of full operations (see Exhibit E-13).

(Related Exhibits: F-2, F-4, E-13).

Annual Incremental Costs That Will be Incurred After Full Operations

The annual incremental costs that will be required on an ongoing basis after full operations are established (i.e. 2008) amount to 84.6 million dollars. Costs appearing in this category are of four kinds:

1. Costs associated with new services - The Legislative Assembly, Executive Council, Justice, and Human Resource & Finance functions would not exist unless a new government were being created. However, revenues exceed costs for the Core Functions by as much as 18.6 million dollars, thereby reducing the incremental cost burden. Other new services include the Land Use Planning Commission, the Wildlife Management Board, the Water Management Board, and the Impact Review Board. Incremental costs for these services are estimated at 4 million dollars per year.

   (Related Exhibits: E-1, E-2, E-3, E-13, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4).

ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᐅᕗᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᒪᕗᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᐊᐃᐸᖕᒐᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔭᕆᕐᓯᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᓱᓕᑲᓂᖅ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᖅᓴᖏᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖅᒐ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖅᑲᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᖅ ᐃᖏᑯᖕᒐᓗᓂ "ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᑎᒃ". ᓇᓗᓇᖏᓂᕐᕐᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓗᐊᓇᐊᖅᑲᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᒪᓕᖕᓗᓂ ᓱᕙᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᖃᖅᑕᐅᔭᕆᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᒋᒐᔭᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᓇᓴᐅᑎᓕᒃ 8-ᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᑯᑦ, ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕗᖅ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᓱᕙᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓕᕐᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ, ᓴᖕᒐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ "ᐱᐅᓯᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓕᓕ ᐱᐅᓯᕐᑐᕐᓗᑎᒃ", ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᖃᖏᕐᓂᐊᕐᐸᑦ, ᐊᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᖕᒐ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ, ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖕᑕᖅ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ, ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᑕᕐᖕᒐᑦ, ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖕᒐ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖕᑐᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᕙᖕᑕᖏᓂᒃ. ᓄᑖᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᓱᕐᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᑦ, ᐃᖏᑯᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᔪᓇᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᓱᓚᑖᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔭᕆᕐᑐᐃᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓚ ᓴᕿᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᔭᑦ ᐊᕿᑏᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᖏᖅᓚᒋᐊᕐᑎᑎᕗᖅ ᖃᓂᑏᖅᔪᒻᒥᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑲᑎᑏᑎᐊᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑐᔾᓗᑎᒃ ᐸᐃᓇᐃᕙᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᖑᔾᔪᑦ.

7. ᐊᔾᔨᐅᖏᑐᖅ ᒐᕙᒪ

ᐱᒻᒪᓇᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᔾᔨᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᑯᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ. ᒪᕗᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᒃ. ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓛᕐᒪᖕᒐᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᑎᑲᓂᓇᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑐᒻᒥᖕᒐ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᓚᓇᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᑯᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᕕᖅᑲᕐᒪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ.

ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑭᒐᕐᑐᐃᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᒍᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᐱᓱᒻᒪᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓱᒻᒪᒋᐊᖏᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᓚᓇᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᓱᓕᓚᓇᖅᓗᑎᖅᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᓱᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐ ᑕᑯᔭᐅᔪᓇᖏᓕᖅ "ᓴᓇᖑᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᑐᑦ ᐅᔭᖅᑲᒧᑦ" ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ; ᐃᓂᖅᑲᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᒪᑦ ᓱᓕᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᓱᕙᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᐅᖏᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᒪᑦ, ᐱᑕᖅᑲᓇᕐᑕᐅᖅ "ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᓚᓇᐅᔪᑦ" ᑲᑐᔾᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕕᐅᔪᖅ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓄᑖᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᖏᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᓱᕙᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔪᓇᕐᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᓂᔪᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᓚᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒻᒥᐅᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ.

ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᑎᑎᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐃᓚᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᑦ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᖕᒐᓕᖑᓗᒋᑦ, "ᑎᑭᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ" ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999 ᐃᓚᖅᑲᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᔭᖅ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᓂᒃ. ᐱᑕᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ (a) ᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᓇᖕᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕙᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ

2. Costs connected with new facilities - These are the costs of operating and maintaining the government and community infrastructure. The latter costs about 340 thousand more per year under the shortened scenario because more community infrastructure is needed to support a greater amount of in-migration.

   (Related Exhibits: E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-18, E-19, F-2 and F-4).

3. Costs pertaining to the new people working at headquarters - These costs include wages and salaries (62.6 million dollars), plus additional costs for recruitment, settlement, vacation travel assistance, and ultimate removal (totalling almost 5 million dollars).

   (Related Exhibits: E-1, E-4, E-13, F-2 and F-4).

4. Costs related to doing business in a more remote part of the country - This expense was included to reflect the fact that it costs substantially more for goods and services in Iqaluit than it does for equivalent items in Yellowknife. The cost of living factor is estimated at about 19 million dollars per year.

   (Related Exhibits: E-13).

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Implications of Transition Periods

As Exhibit 4 indicates, the annual human and financial resources impacts of employing a three- or five-phase transition process are about the same. With respect to human resources, there is no difference in the person years complement, either at headquarters or in the regions. Approximately 50 additional person years are involved in headquarters under a lengthened transition; however, the distribution of local hire appointments is highest among the senior administration positions under either transition scenario. From a financial perspective, the difference in the annual cost of full operations is less than a tenth of a percent, and annual revenues are equal.

In the area of one-time costs, the difference, is inconsequential, given the overall investment and the time period covered. Specifically, it is estimated that the one-time cost under a shortened transition is 6 million dollars more than under a lengthened transition, which would be spread over an additional 9 years.

The significant variance between transition periods of different lengths is the amount of money necessary for other incremental costs during the period of 1992 through 2008. Over a span of 17 years, the government will spend, over and above one-time costs, anywhere from 520 million incremental dollars (if implementation stretches to 2008) to 911 million incremental dollars (if implementation concludes in 1999).

The Importance of Maintaining an Integrated Approach

There are two dimensions of this study, in particular, that distinguish it from previous work associated with the division of Canada's north.

1. This study deals explicitly with the organization design challenges created by seeking to operate a regionalized form of government which maximizes use of the skills of local residents, and has the capacity to become even more regionalized as the needs and preferences of the residents of Nunavut evolve.

2. This study addresses the logistics and costs of the transition process more explicitly than previous work. The process identified, and for which cost estimates are provided, indicates the complexities involved in separating a single functioning government into two discreet governments while maintaining services at acceptable levels of quality and cost.

ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᖅᓱᒍ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᖃᑎᒻᒪᖃᑎᒋᔭᐅᕙᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓯᓂ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ (b) ᐊᕿᖅᓱᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᓗᖅᑕᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓚᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕗᔪᑦ ᓴᖑᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᖅᒥᑯᓚᖕᒐᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᕕᐅᓗᑎᖅᓗ ᐅᑦᓗᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᑕᖅᓴᖏᑦ ᒪᓚᖅᓗᒋᑦ. ᐊᕙᑎᒋᔭᖕᒐ ᖃᖏᕐᓯᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᕕᒋᓯᒻᒪᓗᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᕐᒥᒃ.

8. ᐊᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᓂᖅ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᔭᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓚ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᖑᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ (ᐱᕙᓚᐊᓂᖅ ᓯᑕᒻᒪᖅᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᓪᓚᒻᒪᖅᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᒻᒥ 3), ᐊᒻᒥᓱᐃᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᐸᓚᐊᓚᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᐸᖅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᑯᑦ, ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᕆᐊᖅᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖅ ᓴᐅᓂᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᓂᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᕗᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᕙᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ, ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑎᑎᕋᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓯᕗᓚᐅᕐᐸᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᒪᓚᒐᓂᒃ, ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᖃᓄᓚᓇᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖅᑕ ᒃᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᑦ ᒃᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ, ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᖑᖅᒪᑕ ᐅᖅᑐᕋᐅᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᑎᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᒧᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖅᐱᒋᐊᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᓂᒃᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓚᐊᓚᓯᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᔭᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓚ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᑲᓂᖅ, ᐱᒋᐊᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᐳᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᖅᓴᒻᒥ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖅᑕᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑐᒻᒧᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖅᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᖃᐃᓱᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᔾᔨᓱᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᐃᓄᓚᒐᔭᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕈᑎᒃ.

9. ᒥᑭᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᕕᖅᓴᖃᕈᓇᕐᓂᖅ

ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᐳᖅ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪ ᐊᔪᖏᑕᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᓴᖃᓇᐊᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᒻᒧᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᒋᑦ ᐃᓄᕙᑎᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ. ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖏᑦ ᒪᓚᒐᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᓴᖑᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᓴᓂᓚᓇᖅᑐᑎᒃ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ. ᑕᕝᖑᑦ ᒪᓚᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᑕᓇᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᖑᓂᑦ ᑕᕝᖑᑦ, ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖑᓂᒃ ᒪᓚᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᕕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖑ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓗᓂ, ᐊᔪᖏᑕᒻᒥᓂᒃ ᒥᑭᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑐᓇᕐᑕᒻᒥᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᕐᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᐳᖅ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᐱᔪᓇᕐᑕᒻᒥᓄᑦ. ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑭᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖑᑕ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖕᒐᓇᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᓯᖏᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖕᒐᓇᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᑖᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᖅ ᖃᓄᖅ

Estimating the costs of operating the new government structure and the transition process revealed the extent to which an integrated response will be needed. As costs were estimated in one arena it became clear the "drivers" were linked to other parts of the overall solution. Community infrastructure costs are driven by the amount of in-migration, which is itself driven by the speed of transition and training and the stages at which certain services are brought within the direct delivery responsibilities of the new government. The capital needs for government itself are driven by the number of persons involved, and the timing of their arrival, which is driven by the transition plan, in particular the timing of assumption of direct service delivery for major programs.

These kinds of linkages created tremendous challenges for the study team. A change in any significant element invariably had a ripple effect throughout the costing framework. These same challenges will exist for the Nunavut Implementation Commission and those who support its efforts to manage the transition to start-up in 1999. Changes in objectives, assumptions, transition timing or organization structure will have an immediate impact on cost. Determining the nature and extent of the cost impacts of changes will require constant attention.

This work has focused on estimating the costs of creating and operating the Government of Nunavut. As Chapter one indicated, the cost impact on the GNWT could not be estimated for a number of reasons. It is extremely important to remember the process of creating Nunavut has major implications for the GNWT. Also, as Exhibit 1 indicated, the costs associated with Federal Government Programs and the settlement of Land Claims have not been estimated in this work. A complete picture of total incremental costs associated with the creation and operation of the new government must account for these other costs.

A complete picture will not emerge until the implementation costs of the TFN Land Claim are fully known. The overall incremental cost of operating the Government of Nunavut will also be further refined as the Nunavut Implementation Commission completes its detailed planning work.

Much attention has been given to the importance of a regionally based government. As Exhibit 4 indicates, significant costs are incurred in delivering currently operating regional services. The mandate for this study did not encompass review or evaluation of these services, but clearly the relationship between these services and the new regional structure of the Government of Nunavut will need to be examined as the transition process unfolds. These operations represent a significant part of the overall cost of operating the new government. As well, the skills and experience of those currently delivering these services represents a major opportunity for organization development for the new government. Within this workforce are many of those who will lead the service delivery effort for the Government of Nunavut. It is vital that the long range human resource development strategies needed to make limited in-migration a reality begin immediately, and remain a carefully monitored component of the overall transition plan.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

The economic impacts result from capital expenditures throughout the lengthened transition period (i.e. government facilities plus community infrastructure) and annual incremental spending after full operations are established (i.e. 84.6 million dollars per year after 2008) spending in Nunavut. The impacts were calculated using the GNWT Bureau of Statistics' Closed Input-Output Model. (The open model includes *indirect* spending, meaning spending that the government's suppliers incur; the closed model, which was used for this analysis, includes *induced* spending, meaning spending at the consumer level.) The default multiplier and intensity values were used for both the open and closed

ᐊᑭᒃᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᑐᒃᓱᕋᐅᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑖᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ ᐅᓂᒃᑲᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᒃᑕᐅᓂᐊᕋᓱᒋᔭᐅᓗᓂ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑭᒃᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᓕᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᓇᐊᖅᓴᖅ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᕈᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕈᐊᕐᕕᕈᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕋᒍᒥ 1999. ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑭᒃᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕝᕙᖓ ᐱᕕᐅᕈᐊᖃᕋᔭᕐᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓗᓂ ᑖᓇ ᓇᒻᒪᑲᓗᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᐊᑭᒃᑕᐅᕕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ.

ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ

ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ, ᐅᖃᐅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓱᕐᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑭᒃᓱᒋᐊᖃᕐᓴᖅ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᒥᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑕᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑖᑯᓄᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᕙᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᖓᔪᖅᑲᐅᓂᐊᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᔾᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂ, ᐊᐅᒪᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᖅᑎᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᑕᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑎᕐᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐅᓂᒃᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᓂᕐᓴᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕐᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᓱᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ.

ᓱᕐᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑭᖑᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᒃᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᓱᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑖᑯᓄᖓ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑕᐅᓯᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᓇᐅᔪᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᖓᔪᖅᑲᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ, ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᖅᑎᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᖅ ᐊᐃᕙᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᕕᑎᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᓂᒃᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓴᐅᓂᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑕᐅᕐᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅ.

ᑖᓇ ᓱᕐᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᓇᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᒃᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᑎᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᑕᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᖅ, ᑕᕝᕙᖓᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᓂᐊᓇᓗᓂ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔭᐅᓚᓇᖅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᓇᕕᖅᓗᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐃᑲᔭᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑕ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ.

ᑭᖑᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᐃᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᑖᑯᓂᖓᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕝᕙᖓᑦ ᐃᑲᕐᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ. ᑖᓱᒻᒪ "ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ" ᐊᕐᕕᖅᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᕙᓗᒍ "ᒥᑭᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᕙᓇᒋᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᓇᓱᖅᑕᒻᒥᖅᓂᒃ" ᐊᒻᒪᓗ "ᐊᒻᒥᓗᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᕐᒥᐅᑕᑦ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᓇᐊᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂ" ᐃᖏᕋᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ.

models, and anticipated government spending was converted into commodities and industries currently found in Iqaluit.

Exhibit 6 illustrates the economic impact in terms of employment opportunities, gross domestic product, and gross spending. Capital construction expenditures occurring throughout the entire transition period (1992-2008) will generate 1,135 employment opportunities, spending will exceed 411 million dollars, and the gross domestic product for Nunavut will approach 117 million dollars. Once the government is fully operational (after 2008), incremental spending will generate 622 employment opportunities, spending will exceed 146 million dollars, and the gross domestic product for Nunavut will approach 33 million dollars.

Three aspects of the employment opportunities are worth special mention:

1. Figures shown may not mean an equivalent number of jobs. Some of the opportunities will be filled by people not fully employed in the existing labour pool.

2. Employment opportunities created from capital construction will disappear once construction is completed.

3. Employment opportunities created as a result of incremental spending after full operations have been established are one-time opportunities (i.e. 622 opportunities will be created in 2009, zero in 2010, zero in 2011, and so on, unless the government's spending pattern increases even further.

ᐊᒻᒪᑕᐅᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᖅᑲᑎᒋᑎᐊᕋᔭᕆᖅ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑉ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑕ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᖅᑲᕐᑐᖅᓂ 3, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᓗᓂ ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ D.

ᖃᖓᐅᓛᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐋᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖅᒪᑦ ᑕᕿᕐᓯᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕋᒍᖓᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐱᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᑖᓯᒻᒪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᐅᑉ, ᖃᖓᓕᕆᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᔾᒋᖏᑲᓴᖅᑕᖓ ᑭᐅᕕᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔭᐅᖏᑐᑦ, ᐅᑯᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕋᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓂᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓯᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕕᖅᓴᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ , ᑭᓯᐊᓂ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓯᓂᕐᓯᒻᒪᔭᓇᐊᖃᖏᑐᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.

ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ 1-- ᔭᓄᐊᓇ 1992 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ ᑎᓯᐱᓇ 1992 - ᐋᕿᖅᓯᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᔨᐅᕙᓕᐊᓚᓯᖅᑎᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑦ (ᐃᖅᐊᐃᓯ - ᖃᓗᓈᑎᑐᑦ).

ᑕᕐᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕕᐅᓚᔭᕐᔪᖅ ᐊᕋᒍᖓᓂ ᑖᑯᐊ ᐃᖅᐊᐃᓯᖑᓂᕋᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖓᓂᒃ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᕙᐅᒃ ᐋᕿᖅᑲᐅᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᐃᖅᐊᐃᓯᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐋᕿᖅᕕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᓇᖑᓗᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᖅᓚᖅᕕᖅᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᖅᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᖅᑕᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑎᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ. ᑖᑯᐊ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᑯᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᔾᐅᔪᓄᑦ. ᐋᕿᖅᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᒻᒪᕆᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓂᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᓂ ᑐᖅᓕᐊᓂᑦ - ᒥᓂᔅᑕᐅᑉ ᑐᖅᓕᐊᓂᑦ.

ᑕᕐᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᖅᑲᕐᑐᖅ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᐸᕐᓯᐅᑎᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓴᖅᑕᐅᑎᓂᐅᑉ ᑐᕋᖓᓄᖓᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᓯᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᑐᐃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᓄᕐᑎᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᔪᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖃᑎᒋᔭᐅᖏᒪᖓᑕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐋᕿᖅᓯᒍᓇᓇᐊᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᕋᑎᒋᓇᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᑎᒋᔭᕐᑕ, ᐋᕿᖅᓯᕙᔭᓕᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᕋᑎᖓ ᐋᕿᒋᐊᖃᕐᑕᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ, ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᖏᓂᕐᐸᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᐊᖃᑕᕋᔭᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᑎᓂ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᖓᕐᑐᑦᐃ. ᐋᕿᖅᓱᕐᑕᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᒪᓇᕐᔪᒻᒥ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑕ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕋᔭᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᓇ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᔭᖓᑎᒍᑦ.

ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᓇ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᑖᓯᒻᒥᖓᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒻᒪᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᓚᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᖑᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓚᓯᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥᑦ

ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᑏᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᒪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᒥᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᑲᑎᑦᑎᓯᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᕐᓕᐊᓂ ᐃᕿᕋᕐᑎᒋᓕᐊᔭᖕᒐᓂ ᓱᓕᓗᓂ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕐᓂᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᒐᓚᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᐸᕐᑐᑦ. ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᖕᓴᖕᒐ ᐊᕐᕿᖅᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖅᑲᕐᐳᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓱᓕᓕᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑕᐃᖅᑲᕐᕋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᕐᒥᕐᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕈᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐊᕐᑏᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ.

ᐱᕈᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐ 2 - ᓴᓄᐊᓇ 1993 ᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑎᓯᐱᓇ 1993 - ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᖕ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᑦ, ᐅᖕᒐᑖᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓕᓇᒍᑎᒋᔭᖕᒐᑕ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᔭᖕᒋᑐᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᖃᖕᒋᖅᑲᒻᒥᖅᑲᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1999, ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᐃᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐃᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᒪᑕ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᑕᐃᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑕᐃᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖕᑕᓄᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᔪᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ. ᐃᓚᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖕᒐᑦ, ᓱᕐᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᕈᑏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ, ᐊᖕᑐᕐᐃᐅᖕᒪᑕ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᓗᖕᑖᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ. ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᓱᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ, ᑕᒻᒪᑮᖕᓄᓗ ᐃᖕᐱᒋᑎᑎᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᓗ ᒐᓚᒪᑯᖕᒋᓂᒃ, ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᐃᐊᒋᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖕᑖᖅ ᑐᕐᕆᔭᐅᓇᓱᐊᕐᑐᑦ. ᐃᓚᖕᒋᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᖃᑎᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐃᖕᕋᔪᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᖕᒋᑦ, ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᑕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ ᑕᕝᖕ ᑎᑭᓱᒻᒪᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᕙᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖕᕋᕙᓕᐊᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᑕᕿᑎᑎᖑᓇᒋᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒋᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᒐᓚᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᖑᕐᐸᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ.

ᑖᓱᒻᒧᖕᒐ "ᐊᐅᓚᐃᒋᓕᓇᖕᑕᖕᒐᓂᑦ" ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕝᕙᓇ ᐃᖕᕋᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᖅᑲᕐᖅ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᓇᓕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999. ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᑦ, ᑐᓴᐅᑎᓄᑦ ᓴᓇᕈᑏᑦ, ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᒻᒪᓇᒍᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᐳᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ. ᑐᕐᓇᔭᐅᓇᓱᐊᕐᐳᖅ, ᐃᓱᐊᓂ ᐃᖕᕋᕙᓕᐊᑎᒋᔭᖕᒐᑕ ᑕᕝᕙᓇ, ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐸᕐᓇᐅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᕿᓯᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᖃᓄᓕᓇᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᐊᕐᒪᖕᒐᑦ "ᐊᐅᓚᐃᒋᓕᓇᖕᑕᖕᒐ" ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᐸᑕ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓱᒻᒪᓂᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓗᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕿᕐᓱᐅᑎᑕᒻᒪᓂᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᓴᓄᐊᓇ 1, 1994 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999. ᑕᕝᕙᓇ ᐃᖕᕋᕙᖕᒐ ᐱᖕᒐᓱᐃᓕᖕᒐᓴᕐᓇᐊᕐᑐᖅ. ᓯᕗᓕᕐᐸᖅ ᐃᓕᖅᑲᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᐸᐅᓗᓂ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑐᕐᓕᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᐱᕐᓱᕙᓕᐊᕙᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᐃᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᐱᖕᒐᔪᖕᒐ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᑎᐊᐅᓗᓂ ᐸᕐᓇᒍᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᖅᑲᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᑖᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕙᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᑎᑯᓄᑦ.

ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑕᐅᖅ ᒪᕈᖅᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ (ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ, ᐃᓕᖑᓯᑦ, ᐊᖏᔪᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᓯᑕᒻᒪᖓᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᑐᓕᕆᔨᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓂᐊᕐᓯᐅᑎᓕᕆᔨᑦ ᑕᕐᓕᒻᒪᖓᓂ) ᑕᕗᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᓕᕐᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᕈᒃ ᐊᖏᑯᓕᖓᔪᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᓯᕗᓕᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑎᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᖑᓇᒋᑦ ᐅᖓᑕᓄᑦ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999. ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓗᐊᖏᓂᕐᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᐊᑕᔪᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᔭᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖏᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᔭᒻᒥ, ᓈᒻᒪᑲᖓᑦ.

ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕐᓯᓂᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᖑᓇᒋᑦ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᕕᖅᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᒪᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᑦ ᐊᖑᑎᒋᔭᐅᔭᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕗᓇ ᐃᖏᕋᕕᒋᔭᖓᒍᑦ.

(i) <u>ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᖅ</u> - ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᓴᖓᔭᐅᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᕙᖅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᓂᓴᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓕᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᓄᓇᖅᔭᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔨᐅᕙᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑎᒋᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓇᖅᒥᓂᕐᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᒻᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᒋᖓᕐᑕᖏᓂᖅᓗ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᑎᑭᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᑲᐅᒋᔭᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᑕᐅᓚᕆᐃᓇᕿᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᔭᖅ ᐃᖏᖅᓄᑦ ᐅᖃᒪᕙᖅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔪᒪᖅᒥᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᖑᓇᒋᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᓯᕗᓕᐅᔪᖅᓴᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ.

(ii) <u>ᖃᐅᔨᓇᓱᐊᕐᔪᓕᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ</u> - ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓇᓕᐊᓂᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᔪᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᓇᒋᑦ ᐊᐃᕙᑎᓇᒋᑦ, ᓄᓇᖅᔭᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔨᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓯᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᖃᑎᖃᕐᑐᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᒃ. ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᔪᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᑎᑎᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᖕᓴᑲᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᓕᒪᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓄᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐸᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᕐᓂᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᓂᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓯᓂᓴᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᖃᕈᓇᓕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖓᕈᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᒋᐊᑲᓂᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᕋᓇᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᕐᑐᑦ.

(iii) <u>ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᖏᑦ</u> - ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᓕᒃ (i) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ (ii) ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᒋᐊᑲᓂᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᕐᑕᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑐᐃᓐᓂᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᖑᓇᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᖓᔪᑦ. ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒥᖅᒪᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᕐᑕᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᖑᔭᔪᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖅᓯᒋᐊᑲᓂᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᕐᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᖅᓱᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓕᕐᔪᓕᕐᓂᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᔭᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᑕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᓱᓕᔪᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓕᕆᖅᑐᓂᒃ.

(iv) ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓯᒪᓗᒋᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᖅ - ᐊᕿᒋᐊᑲᓂᕐᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᓯᔾᔭᕐᔪᖅ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓯᒪᓕᕐᓗᓂ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᐃᐅᓗᓂ. ᑖᓯᒪᒪ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᐅᑉ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᑦᑕᓯᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓇᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᐸᕐᓂᖅ ᒐᑭᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᕐᑯᓇᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᑦᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᖅ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᐸᖅᓗᓂᒋᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᑦᑕᓯᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑐᓴᕈᑎ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ "ᓯᓚᑐᓂᖅ" ᑲᑎᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᓇᓴᐅᑎᖅᑲᕐᑐᓂ (i) ᑎᑭᓯᒍ (iii) ᑖᓯᒪᒪ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᓯᓕᕐᑯᓗᒋᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᓯᒪᒪᓂᖅ ᐱᑎᑎᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᕕᖅᓴᐅᓚᓇᖅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᓇᕐᑯᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᑦᑕᓯᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐃᕙᔪᑦ. ᐊᖏᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᖅᑐᕐᓴᐅᖏᑐᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᓂᐊᕐᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᕐᑯᕐᓗᖅᓇᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᒐᓯᐊᕐᑎᐅᔪᓄᑦ.

ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖅ 3 - ᓴᓄᓇ 1994 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1999 - ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐱᖅᓴᓚᓇᒃ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔭᐅᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐱᕐᓯᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖅ

ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᕋᓇᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᕝᓇ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔭᐅᕐᓂᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖅᓴᓂ 2 ᐱᒻᒪᓇᕐᓂᕐᓂᒋᑦ ᓴᕿᓕᓇᖅᓗᑎᒃ. ᐃᓱᐊᓂ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒪᒪᓕᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᓕᕐᓗᓂ "ᐊᐅᓚᑎᐱᓕᓇᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖅ", ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔾᔨᒪᑎᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᔭᖏᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᐊᐃᐱᓇ 1, 1999, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᒐᓯᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ.

ᐱᖓᓱᐃᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᕕᓕᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕝᖓ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ (ᑕᑯᒍᒃ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ 3). ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ "ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓕᓇᖅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ", ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᖅᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓕᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᔪᒻᒥ 2 ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕐᑯᓗᒍ. ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᓕᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᓗᓂ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᖓᓗᓂ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ.

ᓯᕗᓕᖅ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᖅᑲᔭᐅᕐᑯᓇᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᐱᕐᓯᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ. ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓯᒪᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᑦᑕᓯᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᓇᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑲᑎᑦᑕᓂ ᓯᕗᓕᐅᕐᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒪᒪᔪᓂ ᑐᑭᓯᐅᒪᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᓗᖅᑕᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᑐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ. ᑭᐅᕕᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑖᓯᒪᒪ ᐊᐱᕐᓯᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᓯᓐᓕᓕ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᑲᓂᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᕋᓇᔭᐅᔪᒻᒪᔪᓗ.

ᑖᓇ ᓯᕗᓕᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᖅᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᕐᕌᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᒋᓯᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓴᖓᔭᐅᔪᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔾᔭᐃᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐱᕐᓯᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᑯᑦ. ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓚᓇᖅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᑐᐃᓇᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᒥᔪᕐᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ.

ᐅᓂᑲᑎᑦᑯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᑦᑯᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᖑᓗᒍ ᐃᑲᕈᑎᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑯᖅᑕᐅᓂᑦᑐᑦ ᒪᓕᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᖕᒪᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑯᖅᑕᐅᒋᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕝᓂ ᐱᕝᓕᑯᓂᖓᓂ 2, ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᐅᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑯᐱᕐᓱᕐᐸᓕᑯᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕝᓇ. ᖃᓄᑐᐃᓇᕐ, ᐅᖃᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᐃᓇᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᕋᓇᓇᓱᑯᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐅᑭᑯᖅᓴᖓᓂᒃ 1997, ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᕝᓗᖅᑲ ᓱᕐᓂᑯᒍᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑯᖅᑭᓱᓇᑯᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑯᑯᓂᑦ "ᑯᖑᓱᓇᓱᖅᓂᕐᒧᑦ" ᐱᒋᑯᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑯᑐᕐᑕᐅᕕᖃᓇᑯᖃᕐᑐᒧᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᑯᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ, ᐱᒋᑯᕐᕕᖓᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᕐᕕᒋᔪᓴᕐᓂᑯᕐᑕᖅᒋᑦ ᑯᖅᑕᐅᕐᑯᓗᒋᑦ.

ᐱᕝᕙᓂᖓ 4 - ᑯᐃᐱᓇ 1999 ᑎᒋᓗᒍ 2004 ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕝᕙᓂᕐᒥᑦ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᑦ

ᑐᕋᓇᓇᓱᑯᕐᑕᖓ ᑕᕝᓇ ᐃᖓᕋᓂᓇᓂᑯᖅᑕᖓᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᓂᖅ ᑯᐅᓕᕕᒋᓕᓇᖅᓂᑯᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᓯᔭᕆᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑯᑯᓂᐅᓗᑯᖓᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᕙᖅᑐᓂᒃ. ᑕᕝᓇ ᐃᖓᕋᕙᓕᑯᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᓕᖅᑲᕐᓂᑯᕐᐳᖅ ᑭᕐᑭᖅᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᑦᑯᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᖅᐱᒋᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᖅᑭᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᑦᑲᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᑭᖅᑭᓯᒪᔭᕆᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐅᓕᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐃᓕᐅᔪᑦ.

ᑕᕝᓂ ᐱᒋᑯᕐᕕᒋᔭᖓᓂ ᑕᕝᓇ ᐃᖓᕋᕙᓕᑯᑎᓗᒍ, ᓄᑦᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᓕᕋᔭᕐᐳᖅ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕈᑕᐅᕙᖅᑐᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄᑦ.

ᐱᕝᕙᓂᖓ 5 - 2004 ᑎᒋᓗᒍ 2008 - ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᑦ

ᑐᕋᓇᓇᓱᖅᐸᐅᒃ ᑕᕝᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᑯᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᒻᒥᑯᑯᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᕈᑯᖃᕐᑐᑦ. ᐱᕝᕙᓂᖓ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᕝᓇ ᐃᓱᑯᒍᑦ ᐱᕝᕙᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ.

ᐃᖓᕋᑎᑯᕐᓂᖓᑦ ᐱᕝᕙᓂᑯᕝᕙᖅᑐᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ

ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᑯᓂᑯᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᖓᕋᕙᓕᑯᖑᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑯᖅᑭᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑯᐅᓕᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓂᑯᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᖓᓗᓂ: (i) ᑯᐅᓕᔪᑎᓕᓇᖓᑦ; (ii) ᐃᓕᓂᑯᕐᓂᖅ, ᐃᓕᖑᓱᑦ, ᑯᖓᔪᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᔭᓇᑯᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ ᐱᕝᕙᓂᑯᔪᑦ; ᑭᒻᒪᓗ (iii) ᑯᓂᑯᑐᐃᓕᓇᓂᖅ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᔪᕐᓴᕐᑐᓕᓇᓂᖅ.

ᑯᐅᓕᓕᓇᒍᑎᖓᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᑲᕐᖅ ᑕᐃᑯᓂᖓ ᑯᑐᕐᑕᐅᓕᓇᒋᑯᖃᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᖓᔪᖃᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑯᐅᓕᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᕐ. ᓱᕐᓗ, ᓄᓇᖅᑲᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᓇᕋᔭᖓᒻᒪᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓇᒍ ᑯᐅᓕᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᕝᕙᓂᑯᔪᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᑎᓂᒃ. ᐅᐃᒍ D ᑭᖅᑭᓯᒻᒪᔭᖅ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᑯᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑭᖅᑭᓯᐅᓂᑯᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᑭᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᑯᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᔭᐅᒐᓱᑯᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᑯᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᓇᓕᑯᑦ ᑯᐅᓕᔪᑦ

ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᒪᖕᒐ ᐱᕕᓚᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᐅᖅᑕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᓇᖕᕕᐅᓗᑎᒃ. ᐃᖏᕋᓂᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᐃᓐᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᔪᓄᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓐᓚᐊᔪᓄᑦ (ᑕᑯᒍᒃ (ii) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ (iii) ᐅᑯᓇᓂᑐᑦ ᖁᓚᓂ) ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᐳᖅ ᐅᔾᓇᓇᓱᖕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᑯᐊᖑᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ.

1. ᐊᓱᐊᓂᖕᒐᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᐃᑦ

ᓇᒧᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᓐᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒻᒥᓲᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᑎᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᖕᒐᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᐳᖅ ᑭᓱᐊᓂᓚ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᒪᑕᐅᑎᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᕕᒋᒋᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᐃᖅᓇᐃᔭᒐᖕᓴᕐᑕᕐᑎᑕᐅᖕᒐᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᑏᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᕚᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓂᖏᓂᑦ. ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᖅᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔭᖅᑲᓇᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᖅᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᖕᒐᔪᖅᑲᐅᓂᐊᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᕕᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᐳᖅ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᓂᒃ. ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓛᕐᓂᖕᒐ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᕕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕐᕕᒋᔭᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓛᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᕙᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

2. ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᕈᓇᕐᔪᒻᒥᓗᓂ

ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᓂᖑᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᔭᒧᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᒻᒥᖕᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖑᐅᒐᔭᖕᒐᑕ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᓚᓇᖕᑐᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᓄᓇᔭᕐ, ᓱᕐᓗ ᐃᓚᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓚᓇᓂᖅ. ᐊᔪᕐᓇᖏᕕᖕᒐᒍᑦ ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓐᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᑎᑎᔪᓇᖕᒐᓗᒍ ᑭᒐᕐᑐᐃᔪᓂᒃ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓐᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓚᐅᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᐃᓐᓚᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᓚᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ.

3. ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᖑᑎᖏᑦ

ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᑕᐅᓐᓚᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖑᑎᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᐃᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖅᑲᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑯᓂᑲᓴᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᓱᖏᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓱᐅᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᐃᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓐᓚᐊᓂᖏᓄᑦ. ᓇᐅᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᖅ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᓗᔭᕐᑦᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᖑᑎᖏᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓴᕐᕋᐃᖏᑦᑕ, ᖃᖕᒐᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐃᓚᑕᓇᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓚᖕᒐᓇᖅᑐᖅ.

4. ᒪᓚᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᔭᖏᑦ

ᑕᕝᓚ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅᑲᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑕᑦ ᒪᓚᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓄᓗᓂᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᓄᑦ, ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖅᑲᕐᑐᑦ ᓇᓚᐊᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖅᑲᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓚᐅᕐᑦᑦ ᒪᕈᐃᓚᒋᐊᖅᑲᕐᔭᖏᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᕿᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᒪᓚᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᑯᑦ, ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ

ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᐸᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᔾᑏᖅᓯᒻᒥᓇᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᑯᑦ. ᐊᕐᕋᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᒋᐊᖃᕐᐳᖅ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐃᔭᕆᕐᑕᐅᕐᒉᓗᒍ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᒡᓕᔪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕈᓇᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᐳᖅ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ.

5. ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᖏᓇᕐᐸᕐᓇᒋᑦ, ᐊᑲᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᖅᐸᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᒻᒥ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑑᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᒋᓚᓇᖅᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᒐ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ "ᓱᑲᐃᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᒥᑦ" ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᓂ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂ. ᓱᒡᓗ, ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᓂᕐᐸᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᑐᓕᓇᓂᑯᑦ/ᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓕᓇᓂᑯᑦ ᑲᑎᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕝᕙᕐᐸᑕ ᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓕᓇᓂᕐᒥᑦ, ᑕᕝᕙᓕ ᓱᑲᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᑕ ᐱᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᒪᒍ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ.

6. ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ

ᒪᒍᖅᒪᑎᒃ ᐊᑕᔪᒃ ᑕᕗᖓ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᒃ. ᑐᓂᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ. "ᖃᐃᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ" ᒐᕙᒪ ᐱᕕᖅᓴᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᔪᓇᕐᕕᓗᒍ ᓇᕐᒥᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᖅᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖅᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᓴᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓄᖃᐅᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᑎᓇᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᑕᐅᕙᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓱᑲᓂᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐃᓕᑕᓇᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᓇᔭᑦ. ᓱᑲᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᒋᔭᖓ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓴᓇᖅᓴᕋᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓕᐊᕕᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᒥᑭᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᕕᐅᓗᐊᕐᑕᐃᓕᓗᓂ.

7. ᑐᓴᕈᑎᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᐅᑎᕙᖅᓂᖅ

ᐊᖅᓱᔾᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᐅᑎᑎᐊᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᔭᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᔨᓗᐊᕐᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᔾᔨᒋᖏᑦ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᔨᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᖅᒪᑕ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᕐᕋᑎᒋᔭᖓ ᐱᕕᖅᓴᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᕐᑐᖅ; ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑐᖃᐃᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᔪᖅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᓱᔾᔨᕐᔪᓕᓇᖅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖅᒪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᕙᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᓕᒪᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒋᑦ. ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᕐᖅ ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᕙᓗᒍ ᑲᑐᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ.

4. ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒥᒃ

ᓇᓴᐅᑎᓕᒃ 3 ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓯᒻᒪᖕᖅ ᑐᖅᓱᖃᐅᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᓇᖅᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒥᒃ. ᑕᕝᓂᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᖅ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖃᕐᓂᒃᒧᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᓕᖓᓗᓂ - ᐅᕝᔫᓂᑦ ᑕᓕᒻᒪᐃᓕᖓᓗᓂ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ.

ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ 4 ᐃᓗᓕᖃᕐᖅ ᓇᐃᖅᓕᒋᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᓂᒃ, ᐊᕈᖕᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ. ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᑯᓕᖓᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓕᕆᖅᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᖅᓴᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᓕᕐᐱᓗᐊᖓᓂ, ᒪᕿᒃ ᑕᓕᕐᐱᖅᒥᑑᒃ ᐊᓕᕆᖅᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᑦ ᓇᓕᐊᑐᐃᓇᖓᓂ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᐸᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᓂᒃ ᐅᕝᔫᓂᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓚᑕᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᔭᕆᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᒻᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 1999, ᐅᕝᔫᓂᑦ 2008. ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᓯᒻᒥᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᑯᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ F. ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ F2 ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᖅ 1999 ᑕᑯᒍᐊᕐᓱᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᒐᔭᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ F-4 ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᖅ 2008 ᑕᐅᑐᒍᐊᕐᓱᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᒐᔭᕐᓂᖓ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓂᐊᕋᓱᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᕈᖕᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐃᓄᓕᐅᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᖃᑕᕐᒪᖓᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᕝᒍᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ F ᐅᓂᕐᖃᓇᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᐃᒍᒻᒥ E.

ᑐᓴᕈᑏᑦ ᐅᖃᑎᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᑕᒻᒥ 4 ᑲᑎᕐᓱᕐᓯᒻᒪᖕᑦ ᓇᓕᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᓂᒃ, ᐊᕋᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᐊᕈᖕᓂᒃ ᐊᐃᓕᓕᓇᓕᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕋᒍᑕᒻᒪᕐᓯᐅᑎᓄᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓄᑦ.

ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᑦ, ᐊᕈᖕᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ

ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᑦ

ᑲᑎᓯᒋᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖅ ᓇᓕᐅᑕᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐅᓄᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒋᓂᒃ 1,636 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᑦ, ᓱᕙᑎᒋᓇᒍ ᓇᓕᐊᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒐᓗᐊᕐᐸᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᕙᑎᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ. ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓚᑕᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᓯᒻᒪᖕᑐᖅ 706 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᑦ. ᐊᖅᓚᖅᕕᓚᕆᖅᓴᖕᒋᑦ ᖃᓇᑕᖃᕐᕕᖅᓴᖕᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓚᑕᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ, ᐅᓄᕐᓯᒋᐊᕈᓇᕐᓯᑎᒃ, 930-ᖑᔪᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᕈᓕᕐᑕᐅᕝᖅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᕋᒍᖕᑦ.

ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖅᒪᖅᕕᓚᕆᖅᓂ ᖃᓇᑕᖃᕐᕕᖅᓂ ᐅᖓᑕᓄᑦ 4/5 (ᓯᑕᒻᒪᐃᑦ ᑕᓕᒻᒪᓂᑦ) ᐱᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓚᑕᓂᑦ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒋᑕ. ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ

ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᑦᑐᖅ ᐱᕕᐅᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐱᕕᖅᓴᖃᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓂᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᔪᑦ. ᐃᒻᒪᐃᓕᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ, ᒪᓕᖅᐸᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ, 129 ᐃᓂᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐃᓕᐅᖃᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᕐᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᓂᑦ. ᑖᓇ ᓈᓴᐅᑎ ᐅᓄᕐᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᑎᑭᓱᒍ 177 ᒪᓕᖅᐸᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᐸᑦ.

ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖅᒥᖅᓄᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᓄᓇᔭᒻᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑯᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᓴᓂ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᑕᐅᖅ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᒋᔭᕐᑦ. 60-ᔾᔪᓐᖑᔪᑦ ᐊᒐᔪᖃᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 42-ᔾᔪᓐ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᓂ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓂᓕᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᓗᒍᓗ 75-ᔾᔪᓐ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 40-ᔾᔪᓐ, ᐊᑐᓂᑦ, ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᕝᕕᓕᐊᖅᐸᑦ.

ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᖅᐸᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐱᕕᖅᓴᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖅᓴᕐᑖᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᒥᐅᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᐅᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᑦ ᐃᓄᓕᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᒻᒥᐅᓄᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᐅᔪᑦ: **E-1, E-4, E-8, E-13, F-2,** ᐊᒻᒪᓗ **F-4**).

ᑐᖅᓕᐊ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᕋᔭᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᒪᓕᖅᓱᓂ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᐊᕕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᐸᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ, ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ, ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᔾᖅ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐱᔭᐅᖅᐸᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᓂᑯᑦ (50-ᔾᔪᓐ ᐊᕙᖏᑦ), ᑲᒻᒪᔨᐅᔪᑦ (ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 51-ᔾᔪᓐ), ᕿᑎᐊᓂᑐᑦ (ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 40-ᔾᔪᓐ), ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᐅᓂᐊᕐᓴᐃᑦ (ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 52-ᔾᔪᓐ) ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᓴᑦ ᖃᓯᑦ ᐃᓄᓕᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᑎᑭᑐᓇᕐᑕᖓ 460.5. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᒪᓈᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᔭᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᓚᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓗ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓇᑕᖃᕐᕕᖓᓂ, ᓴᖓᔭᐅᓚᓇᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᖅᓱᕈᔭᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᐃᓄᓕᕐᑕᐅᖓᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕙᖏᑦ ᐃᓂᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐃᓄᓕᕐᑕᐅᖓᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ.

ᑭᓱᐊᓂᓕ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑐᖅᓕᐊᓄᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᐊᐅᓱᒻᒪᔭᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ 177-ᓂᒃ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᒋᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖏᑐᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ: **F-5**).

ᐊᕋᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᓇᓕᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ

ᐊᕋᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᐸᖅᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ $620 ᒥᑦᓕᐊᑦ ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ

ᓱᑲᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᑲᐃᑎᓗᒍᓗᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ. ᐊᕕᒃᑐᕐᓱᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ $233 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ 38-ᔾᔪᓐ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᕕᓚᓇᖓᓂᑦ

ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ $387 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᖓᓄᑦ 62-ᔾᔪᓐ. ᑭᖑᓕᖅ, ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᑕ ᐊᕿᒃᑕᐅᓱᒪᒪᔪᖅ $75 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ, ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᖓ 312 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ, ᐊᑭᒋᓐᐅᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᑭᖓᑕ. ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓱᒪᒪᔪᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ $134 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ ᖑᓐᓱᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᔭᖅ ᑕᐃᑯᓇᖓᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᖓᓄᑦ $102 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᓗᓂᑦ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᓚᓇᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ $63 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ. ᐊᒻᒥᐊᑯᖓ $12 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᑦ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᒐᔭᕐᔭᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖕᒋᑐᑦ ᑖᑯᓇᖓᕐᑐᑦ.

ᐊᐅᓚᓂᓚᓇᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᑕ, ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐃᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᑕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕᒋᑕ ᐃᓱᐊᒍᑦ ᑖᑯᓂᖓᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᕕᐅᔭᖕᔾᑦ ᓇᓚᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐃᖕᕐᓂᓇᓚᐊᔭᖓᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ, ᓇᓚᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓇᖅ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ, ᐊᕿᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᒋᔭᖓ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ, ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᕐᑕᐅᓯᓚᐊᓯᖕᓂᖕᒋᓄᓗ ᐊᑭᖕᒋᑕ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓱᒪᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖓ ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᔭᕐ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑯᓄᑦ.

ᑭᓱᐊᓂ, ᒪᓕᖕᓱᓂ ᕿᓇᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐱᔭᐅᑲᓂᓇᐊᕐᑲᕋᔭᕐᐳᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑕᐅᕐᓗᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᓄᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᕈᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᕐᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᑎᑭᐸᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ, ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐃᓱᓕᐸᑦ ᐊᕿᒍᒻᒥ 1999, ᐊᑭᓛᒋᐊᖃᕋᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᑦ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖓᓂ $340 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᑲᓂᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᕿᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑕᐅᕐᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᕿᒃᑕᐅᓱᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᒐᓐᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᓄᑦ: **E-1, E-2, E-3, E-9, E-19,** ᑎᑭᓗᒍ **F-2** ᐊᒻᒪᓗ **F-4).**

ᐊᕿᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ

ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐱᕕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓱᑐᕐᓂᖕᒋᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒋᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑭᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒋᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᑲᐃᑯᓂ ᓱᑲᒐᓗᐊᕐᓗᓂᓗᓂᑦ. ᐊᕿᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᑲᓂᒋᔭᖓᓂᑐᑦ $295 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ, ᐊᖕᑎᒋᓂᖅᑐᖅ 15-ᔾᔪᓐ ᐱᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᕕᒋᓚᓇᖕᑕᖓᓂᑦ, 55-ᔾᔪᓐ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᓂᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 30-ᔾᔪᓐ ᒐᓐᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖕᒋᓂᑦ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓚᐅᔭᖕᒋᓂᖕᒋᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᒃᑐᕐᓱᒪᒪᔪᓂ, ᐊᕕᒃᑐᕐᓱᒪᒪᔪᓂ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓚᐊᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᖕᒋᓂᐊᕋᓱᒋᔭᐅᓱᒪᕐᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᓄᑦ: **E-1, E-20, F-2** ᐊᒻᒪᓗ **F-4).**

ᐊᑭᑐᖅᐊᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ

ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ 5 ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓗᐊᕐᔪᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᑕᐃᑯᓂᖓ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ ᓴᖅᑭᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᑖᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒻᒪᒥᒃ. ᑖᑯᐊᖑᔭᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕋᔭᓕᐅᖏᑐᑦ ᓄᑖᖅ ᓄᓇᔭᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᖏᔪᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᐱᑎᑎᖏᑐᖅ ᑕᒻᒪᑭᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᑐᕆᐊᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᔪ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᐱᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᐃᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖑᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᒻᒥ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᐅᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒪᒋᕕᒋᖏᒻᒪᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᖏᑕᐅᑐᐃᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓚᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᔪᑦ.

ᓄᑖᑦ, ᐊᑭᑲᓂᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᔭᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᖓᓂᒃ, ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ. ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᖅᑕᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕋᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ, ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᖏᑯᓕᖓᓗᑎᒃ.

ᐊᑕᐅᓯᓕᕆᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑭᑐᕈᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓕᕆᓕᕐᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ

ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᑮᑦ ᓴᕿᕋᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕋᒍᖏᓂ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᒐᕙᒪ "ᓴᓇᔭᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ". ᑕᕙᓕ ᑭᓯᓗᖅᑕᖏᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᐸᑕ, ᑖᓇ "ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᖅ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖅ" ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕈᓂᕋᔭᕐᑐᖅ. ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᖑᓇ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᑐᐃᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖃᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ (ᓱᕐᓗ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᖑᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂᖓᖏᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᖑᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐃᓂᖅᓴᖏᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᕐᑐᐃᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᖃᓇᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ, ᒪᓕᒐᐃᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖏᓄᑦ, ᑕᑕᑎᓇᐊᓛᑦ ᐸᐃᑉᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖅᓚᖅᐱᓯᐅᑎᑦ, ᖃᓇᑕᖑᐊᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᐱᓇᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ, ᖃᓇᑕᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖅᓚᖅᐱᖃᕐᓂᖅ), ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑭᖓ ᓴᓇᓂᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑕᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ.

ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᑕᕙᖓᑦ $334 ᑎᑭᓱᒍ $340 ᒥᓕᐊᑦ. ᓇᐃᖅᓕᒋᐊᕐᓯᒻᒪᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑭᖃᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖓᓂ $6 ᒥᓕᐊᑦ ᐊᑭᑐᓂᕐᓴᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᐊᔾᑎᒋᓂᖓ ᓴᕿᕋᔭᖅ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᒻᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᒪᑕ ᓱᓚᑖᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ, ᐱᑎᑎᒋᐊᕐᓂᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᖃᑲᓂᓕᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖅᑐᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᓯᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ.

ᐊᓯᖏᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᑭᑐᕆᐊᕈᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᕋᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᕆᖕᓂᐊᓴᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2008

ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕᓄᑦ, ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᑭᓚᕐᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᓚᕆᐊᑲᓂᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᓚᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᒍᑕᒻᒪᖅ, ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᓚᕆᐊᖃᑲᓂᕆᐊᖃᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᖕᒐᓂ 1992 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 2008, ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓚᐊᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᒻᒪᓇᐃᒻᒪᑦ $911 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1999 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ $520 ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2008. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᒋᔭᖅ, $391 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᑲᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᕙᓚᐊᓂᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᖕᒐᓂ 2000 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 2008. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓚᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐃᖏᕋᕙᓚᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᖕᐸᑦ ᐊᕐᒍ 1999 ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᕙᓚᐊᔭᖏᑦ ᑐᓴᕐᑎᑕᐅᕙᓚᐊᖅᒪᑕ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ; ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖅᓗᐃᑦ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓇᔭᕐᐳᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᔭᐅᒐᔭᕐᐳᑦ.

ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᕗᖅ ᑕᕗᓇ ᐊᕕᖅᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓱᒻᒪᖅᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑭᑐᓂᕐᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 1999 ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᒐᔭᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ. ᓱᕐᓗ, ᒪᓕᖅᓱᒍ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐋᕿᖅᓱᐃᕙᓚᐊᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑲᑎᓱᒋᑦ $110 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 2008, ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ $31 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ ᐊᑭᑐᓂᕐᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᕿᖅᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᓱᒻᒪᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ. ᐊᓱᖕᒐᑕᐅᖅ ᐅᖅᑐᕋᐅᑕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᑭᑐᓂᕐᓴᐅᓇᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂ $6 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ, ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 2008, ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᕙᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖏᕋᑎᑕᐅᕙᓗᒍ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᓴᓇᕙᓚᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖅᓗᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓱᒻᒪᓚᕋᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᓱᕋᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓂᖅᓴᖕᒐᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᑯᓂ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᖅᐸᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᓄᑦ; E-9, E10, E-11, E-12, E-18, E-19; E-1, E-2, E-3, E-15, E-16, E-17; F-2 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ F-3).

ᓇᓕᐊᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᑭᓚᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕗᓇ ᐊᑭᒋᕙᐅᒃ ᑲᑎᓱᒍ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᖕᒐᓄᑦ ᐱᒋᐃᒋᓚᕆᖕᑕᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᐃᒻᒪᐃᑐᖅ, $251 ᒥᓪᓚᐊᓐ ᑎᑭᑎᓗᒍ 2008 ᒪᓕᖅᒐᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᖏᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᖅᐸᑦ, ᑲᑎᓱᒍ ᑎᑭᑐᖅ ᒪᕈᐃᕐᓱᒍ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᖅᓂᖕᒐᓂᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓚᐊᓂᕐᑎᓗᒍ.

ᐊᒻᒪᑕᐅᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᓂᕐᔪᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔾᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᐃᒻᒪᕐᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔾᑦ, ᓄᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᕙᖅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔾᑦ.

ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 1999 ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑎᑯᑦ ᓇᓕᐊᑐᐃᓇᖕ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᑲᐃᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᑲᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑎᒍᓗᓂᑦ, ᑲᑎᕝᕕᓕᐊᓂᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᕈᑦ ($44 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᓐ) ᑖᓇᓴᐃᓇᐅᕗᖕ ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖕ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᒐᓗᐊᕈᓂ.

ᑭᖑᓕᕐᕌᖕ ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖕᓕᕕᓕᕆᕐᒥ ᓴᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᕐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ (ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᕐᑐᒻᒥ ᐱᕚᓕᐊᔪᑦ; ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓱᕐᑕᐅᕚᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐊᖕᓕᖕᕕᖃᓕᕆᖕᓂᕐᒧ ᐊᖏᔪᓗ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏᓄᑦ; ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕐᓂᖕ ᐃᓕᖑᓱᓗ; ᐊᔪᕐᓴᕐᑐᓕᕆᓂᖕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᓕᕆᓂᖕ). ᐊᑯᓂᖓᓂ 1992 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 2008, ᑖᓇ ᐊᑐᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᑎᑭᓇᔭᕐᖕ $475 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᓐ ᒪᓕᓱᓂ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ $248 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᓐ ᒪᓕᖕᓗᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᓗᒍ. ᐊᔾᑏᖕᓂᖓ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᖕ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐃᑦ, ᖃᐃᑕᐃᒐᔭᕐᒪᑕ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᖕ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᐅᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᖃᓗᖕ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᐅᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᓐᖓᑦ ᑲᑎᓱᑦ ᐊᑭᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᓂᑦ. ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᖕ ᑖᓇᓴᐃᓇᐅᕗᖕ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᕆᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ (ᑕᑯᒍᒃ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᖕ E-13).

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᑦ: F-2, F-4, E-13).

ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᕐᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᖃᓕᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᕆᓕᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ

ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᖃᐅᔭᐅᓚᒐᑎᒃ ᐃᖏᕋᐃᓇᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᕆᓕᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᑎᑦ (ᓱᕐᓗ 2008) ᑎᑭᔾᖕ $64.6 ᒥᒃᓕᐊᓐ. ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᔾᓇ ᓱᑕᒻᒪᐅᖕᒪᑕ:

1. <u>ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᓄᑖᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᖕᓴᐅᔪᓄᑦ</u> - ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐅᕐᑏᑦ, ᐊᖕᒐᔪᖃᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᕋᓛᑦ, ᒪᓕᒐᓕᕆᓂᖕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᓂᖕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐃᖏᕋᓂᖏᑦ ᓴᕿᔭᕋᔭᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᐱᑕᖃᕋᔭᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᓄᑖᖕ ᒐᕙᒪ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓱᔪᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᕆᖕᕕᖓᓂᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ $18 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᓐ, ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᒪᑦ ᒥᑭᖕᓕᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᒐᔭᕐᖕ ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ. ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᓄᑖᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᓇᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐸᕐᓇᖕᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ, ᓂᕐᔪᑎᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᕐᔪᐊᑦ, ᐃᒻᒪᕐᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᑦᓕᐊᕙᕐᑐᑦ ᑲᑎᒻᒪᔨᑦ. ᐊᑭᓕᕆᐊᖃᖃᓂᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ $4 ᒥᓪᓕᐊᓐ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ ᐊᑕᐅᓱᕐᒥ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᑦ: E-1, E-2, E-3, E-13, F-1, F-2, F-3 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ F-4).

2. <u>ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᓄᑖᓄᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᓄᑦ</u> -

ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᖑᕗᑦᑕ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖕᓯᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖕᓚᖕᐱᖕᓴᐃᑦ, ᑭᖑᓕᖕᒐ ᐊᑭᖕᒐ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂ 340,000-ᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᖕ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᒥ ᓇᐃᓂᕐᓴᒻᒥᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕐᑕᐅᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐃᑦ ᑎᑭᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᖑᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓇᐊᕐᑐᕐᑐᑦ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᑦ: **E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-18, E-19, F-2, F-4).**

3. <u>ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐃᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᑖᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓴᐃᔭᕐᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓴᐃᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᖕᓚᖕᐃᓚᓇᖕᒥ</u> - ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᕐᑖᓇᕐᓚᖏᓂᒃ ($62.5 ᒥᖕᓚᐊᖕ), ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᓴᖃᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᑖᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐃᓂᓚᖕᓴᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ, ᒥᖑᐃᕐᓯᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᔪᕐᓯᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕐᑕᐅᓛᕐᑐᑦ (ᖃᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂ $5 ᒥᖕᓚᐊᖕ).

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᑦ: **E-1, E-4, E-13, F-2, F-4).**

4. <u>ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖕᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᖑᓱᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᑎᓂ</u> - ᑖᑯᐊ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᓗᑎᒃ ᓱᒋᓚᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑯᑐᓂᕐᓴᐅᖕᒪᑕ ᑭᓱᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᑏᓗ ᐃᖃᓗᖕᓂ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇᓴᐃᓈᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᔭᓗᓇᐃᒻᒥᐅᖑᓂᕐ. ᐊᑭᖕᒐ ᐅᒻᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᖕ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂ $19 ᒥᖕᓚᐊᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᒥ.

(ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᑦ: **E-13).**

ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᔪᑦ

ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᖕ 4 ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ, ᐊᕐᒍᑕᒻᒪᒧᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᖓᓱᓂᒃ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᑕᓕᒻᒪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᓗᓂ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑖᓇᓴᐃᓇᑲᓴᒃ. ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᓴᐃᑦ, ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑕᖃᖏᑐᖕ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᖏᓂ ᐊᑭᓕᕐᑐᕐᑕᐅᕙᖕᑐᓂᒃ, ᓇᓕᐊᓂᑐᐃᓇᖕ ᐊᖕᒪᖕᕕᓇᓇᖓᓂ ᐅᕙᓗᓂᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ. ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂ 5ᒃ-ᑲᓂᐅᔪᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᖏᑦ ᐃᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᖕᒪᖕᕕᓇᕐᑭᖕᒥ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖕ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ; ᑭᓱᐊᓂ, ᓱᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᖕᐸᑕ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᔨᓂ ᐊᖑᔪᖃᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓂ ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖕ ᓱᑲᐃᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᑲᑎᓗᒍᔭᓂᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ. ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃᓂ ᐃᓱᒻᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ, ᐊᔾᔨᖏᓂᖓ ᐊᕐᒍᑕᒻᒪᖕ ᐊᑭᒋᓇᔭᖕᑕᖓ ᐊᐅᓇᓚᓇᓂᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᒥᑭᓂᕐᓴᐅᕐᖕ 1/10-ᔾᔪᓴᖕ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᒍᑕᒻᒪᖕ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᖕᑐᑦ

ᑖᓇᓴᐃᓇᐅᕐᑦ.

ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ, ᐊᔾᑏᖏᓂᖓ, ᓱᖑᑕᐅᓗᐊᖏᑐᖅ, ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖅᑯᐃᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑯᐅᔪᖅ. ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ, ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᖏᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ $6 ᒥᑦᓕᐊᓐ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᖅ ᑖᓱᒻᒪᖓᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᕐᓴᖅ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᐅᖓᓂᑦ, ᓱᐊᒻᒥᓱᒻᒪᒐᔭᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑲᓂᕐᓂᒃ 9-ᓂᒃ

ᑕᑯᔅᓴᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᔾᒋᖏᓂᖏᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᑎᒋᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔭᕐᑭᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᐃᓄᑦ ᐊᑯᓂᖓᓂ 1992 ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2008. ᐊᑯᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᐃᑦᑕ 17. ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑭᓐᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ, ᓇᑭᑐᐃᓇᖅ $520 ᒥᑦᓕᐊᓐᒥᑦ (ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕝᕕᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᑕᓯᓴᕐᓂᐊᕐᐸᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2008) ᑎᑭᓗᒍ $911 ᒥᑦᓕᐊᓐ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ (ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕝᕕᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓂᐊᕐᐸᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᒥ 1999).

ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖕᓯᓇᐊᖕᓴᖅ ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᓂᒃ ᐋᖕᓯᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ

ᒪᕈᐃᓕᖓᖕᒪᑦ ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ, ᐊᔾᑏᖏᒪᒍ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᒍᓇᐅᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑦ ᐅᑭᐊᕐᑕᕐᑐᖓ.

1. ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑏᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓗᐊᕐᔾᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓯᒻᒪᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᖕᓯᕈᕐᓇᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᕿᓂᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᓂᖕᓗ ᐊᑐᕐᐸᒍᓇᖑᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᓇᕐᓂᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑲᓂᕈᓇᕐᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᔪᒻᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᒋᔭᐅᖓᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ.

2. ᑖᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᓂᑲᓇᑎᐊᑲᓂᕋᓱᐊᕐᓱᑦ ᑕᐃᓱᒪᓂᓂᐅᖓᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᒍᓇᐅᕐᑐᒻᒥᐅᖓᓂᑦ. ᐊᖑᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓕᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ, ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕝᕕᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖕᒪᑕ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᓗᔭᕐᓱᑎᖕᓗ ᒪᓕᖕᑕᐅᔭᕐᑭᐊᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᖅ ᐃᖏᕋᔪᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᐅᑎᐊᕈᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᖅ ᒪᕈᐃᓕᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᖕᒥᑯᓂᖓᓕᕐᓗᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᓗ ᐱᓯᒻᒪᖕᓯᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᕈᓇᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓇᒻᒪᖕᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑲᐅᑎᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᕈᖏᑎᒍᓗ.

ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕈᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᑖᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒪᒥᒃ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕝᕕᖅ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᕐᑐᑦ ᑭᐅᒍᓇᕆᐊᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖃᕈᓇᕆᐊᖏᓂᒃ ᐱᔭᐅᔭᕐᑭᐊᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ. ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᔾᑏᖏᑐᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᖑᐊᕐᓯᒋᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᕈᓂᓚᐅᕐᑐᖅ "ᐊᖑᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓄᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖕᑖᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᖑᐊᕐᓯᒋᑦ. ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᖕᒪᑕ

ᒪᓕᖅᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓯᐊᓂᖕᒐᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᖕᒐᓂᒃ, ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᓗ ᑕᒻᒪᓇ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᓱᑲᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᐃᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑎᑭᐸᓕᐊᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐊᓐᖏᑦ ᖃᐃᑕᐅᖅᐸᑕ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᖅ ᑲᒻᒪᑎᔭᐅᔪᓇᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓇᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᒧᑦ. ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑎᑭᑎᐊᖃᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᐅᑦ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᖃᓯᓄᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᕐᓄᑦ ᐅᓄᕐᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᑎᑭᐸᑕ, ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐸᕐᓇᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓᓄᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᒃ ᖃᖓᐅᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᓚᓇᒍᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ.

ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᖕᓱᕈᑕᐅᒪᐅᕐᒪᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦ. ᓇᓕᐊᑯᑐᐃᓇᖅ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᕐᑐᖃᕐᓂᕐᐸᑦ ᑕᓐᖓᓕ ᓱᕐᓗ ᑯᖕᑐᑎᑐᑦ ᐱᓐᖕᐃᖕᒪᑦ ᑕᐃᒻᒪᐃᓗᖕᑖᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᖓᑕ ᑕᐅᑐᓇᕐᒐᐊᕐᔭᖕᑕᖏᑦ. ᑖᑯᐊᓴᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᖕᓱᕈᕐᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᖕᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᑕᐅᓇᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᕕᖓᓂᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 1999. ᐊᓯᔾᔨᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᕋᓇᔭᐅᓇᓱᐊᕐᑐᑦ, ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ, ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᕕᖕᓴᖓ ᐅᑭᓗᓂᑦ ᑲᑐᔾᔨᐅᔪᑦ ᐋᑭᖕᓯᒻᒪᓂᖓ ᕿᓚᒻᒥᓚᓇᑯᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐊᑭᖏᓂᒃ. ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᖃᓄᐃᑑᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᐊᑭᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᖓᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᖏᓇᓇᐊᖃᕐᐸᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ.

ᑖᑯᐊ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓗᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖕᓴᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᑭᖕᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᖕᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᖕᓴᖓᓂᒃ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᓱᖕᓚᕐᒥᒃ ᐅᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ ᐅᖃᕐᓱᒻᒪᖕᒪᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᓚᖕᒥ 1, ᐊᑭᖓ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ ᓈᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᔪᓇᖏᒪᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᑲᓴᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ. ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓚᓇᖅᐳᖅ ᐃᖃᐅᒻᒪᒋᐊᖅᓴᖅ ᐊᕕᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓ ᑮᕿᖕᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᖕᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕈᑎᕐᑲᕐᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ ᒧᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᑯᖏᓄᑦ. ᐊᒻᒪᓗᑕᐅᖅ, ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ 1 ᑕᑯᑎᑎᐅᖅ, ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᑐᖃᑯᑦ ᑲᒻᒪᒋᔭᖏᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᕿᖕᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᑕᕐᓂᖅ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᓇᓚᐅᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᖏᒻᒪᑕ ᑖᑯᑎᒍᓇᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᓯᒻᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᑕᐅᑐᖕᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑭᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑕᔪᑦ ᑮᕿᖕᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᐅᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊᑕᐅᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᖕᓴᕐᓯᐅᕐᐃᒋᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᐅᖅ ᐊᑭᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ.

ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᑕᐅᑐᖕᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᖑᐊᖓ ᓴᕿᔭᖏᑐᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓚ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᕿᓚᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑭᖓ ᑐᖓᕕᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓇᖕᒥᓂᕐᑖᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒻᒪᐅᔭᐅᓚᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕᓗᖕᑖᖅ ᐊᑭᓚᕐᑕᐅᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᖕᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐊᕿᑭᐊᕐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕐᓗᓂ ᑖᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᖕᒻᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᒻᒥᓴᑯᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᕐᓱᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖑᔪᓂᒃ.

ᓴᖓᕕᐅᓇᖕᓱᒻᒪᖕᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓂᓗᓂ ᒐᓯᒪᐅᔪᖅ. ᑕᐃᒻᒪᓇ ᑕᑯᔭᖅᓴᖅ 4 ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ, ᐊᒥᓱᑦ ᐊᑭᖏᑦ ᓴᕿᕋᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕝᕕᓂᐊᓂᑯᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᖅᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓱᒻᒪᓂᓇᔭᖓ ᑖᓱᒻᒧᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓱᓱᒻᒪᖏᑐᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᓂᒃ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕝᕕᖕᑐᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᓇᓗᓇᖏᑐᖅ ᐊᑕᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᖕᒥᖕᓄᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕈᑕᐅᕝᕕᖕᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᑖᖅ ᐊᕕᖕᑐᕐᓱᒻᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᓯᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᒐᓯᒪᖓ ᓄᓇᖕᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓴᕐᓇᐊᖃᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ

ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᔪᐃᑦ ᓴᕿᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᒻᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᐅᓇᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕗᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᕿᒋᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᒪᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᑕᒻᒥᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒻᒥᒃ. ᐊᒻᒪᓗᓱᓕ, ᐊᔪᐃᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᕐᔭᕐᓱᒻᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᐸᒃᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᕕᒋᔪᓇᕐᑕᖕᓂᒃ ᑲᑐᔾᔾᐅᔪᖕ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᖕᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᒻᒧᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᒻᒧᑦ. ᑖᑯᓇᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓂ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖕᒪᑕ ᑕᐃᑯᐊ ᓱᖕᓕᐅᕐᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓱᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖕᓱᕈᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻ. ᐊᑐᕐᓇᓕᓇᖕᐳᖕ ᐊᑯᓂᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒻᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᕐᓴᕐᑕᐅᔭᕿᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒥᓱᖕᓂᕐᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᖕᖑᕐᑐᖕ ᑎᑭᐸᓕᐊᕙᖕᓇᒋᑦ ᐱᒋᐊᓕᓇᖕᒍᓗᒋᓗ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᖕᓇᐸᖕᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒻᒪᐃᑕ ᐊᑕᐃᐅᔪᑦ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᕙᓕᐊᓂᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐃᓂᕐᒥᒃ.

ᑮᓇᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ

ᑮᓇᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕝᕙᖕ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᒻᒥᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᕐᕙᑎᓕᒪᖕᒐᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᓂ (ᓱᕐᓗ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐃᖕᓗᕙᑎᖕᓴᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒌᖕᑐᓂ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐃᑦ) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒻᒪᖕ ᐊᑐᖃᑕᓇᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓇᓕᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕿᖕᑕᐅᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ (ᓱᕐᓗ $84.6 ᒥᕐᓕᐊᓐ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒻᒪᖕ ᑭᖑᓂᐊᒍᑦ 2008) ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᕙᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ. ᖃᓄᖕ ᓱᓂᕐᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᖕᒐᑦ ᓈᓴᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓇᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓱᐊᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᓇᑕᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ. ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᐊᑐᓇᐊᖃᕐᔭᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓇᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᐊᕿᖕᓱᒻᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᖕᓂ.

ᑕᑯᔭᖕᓴᖕ 6 ᑕᑯᑎᑎᕗᖕ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓂᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᕕᖕᑐᓇᕐᑐᑦ, ᓄᓇᓕᖕᓂ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒻᒪᖕ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᕙᖕᑐᑦ. ᐊᖕᓚᖕᕕᓴᓕᓇᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖕᑲᖕᕕᖕᓴᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᓱᓂᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑯᓂᓕᒪᖕᒐᓂ (1992-2008) ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᒪᑦ 1,135 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐᑎᓄᑦ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓱᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ $411 ᒥᕐᓕᐊᓐ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑎᓱᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᑲᓴᖕᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ $117 ᒥᕐᓕᐊᓐ. ᑕᕝᕙᓕ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᖕ ᐊᐅᓚᓇᓕᕐᔪᑦ (ᐅᖕᒑᓂ 2008), ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᔪᖕᓂᖕ ᐱᑎᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᖕ 622 ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᖏᕐᓱᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ $146 ᒥᕐᓕᐊᓐ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑎᓱᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᖃᓂᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖕ $33 ᒥᕐᓕᐊᓐ.

ᐱᖕᓱᐃᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᕐᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᑎᒍ:

1 ᓈᓴᐅᑏᑦ ᑕᑯᖕᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓴᐃᓇᓇᔭᖕᑕᖏᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓴᐃᑦ. ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐱᕕᐅᔪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒪᑕ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᓚᑖᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒻᒥ ᓴᓇᔪᓂ.

2. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑲᐃᐅᔪᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᓴᖅᑭᖅᓱᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᖑᔪᖅᑲᖅᑲᐃᖕᓯᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓯᓚᓇᖅᑲᐃᖕᓂᒃ ᓴᓇᓂᖅᒧᑦ ᐱᑕᖅᑮᓂᖅᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᖕᓴᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᔭᕇᖅᑕᐅᖕᐸᑕ.

3. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑕᖅᑲᐃᐅᔪᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᖅᑭᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᖅᓂᖏᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓚᓇᓕᖅᑲᖅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᖅᑭᖕᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᖅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᐃᐅᔪᓇᖅᓗᑎᒃ (ᓱᖅᓗ 622 ᐱᐃᐅᔪᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᖅᑭᖕᑕᐅᓂᐊᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2009, ᐱᑕᖅᑲᖏᑐᒻᒥᑦ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ 2010, ᐱᑕᖅᑲᖏᑐᖕ ᐊᕐᒍᒻᒥ 2011, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕗᖕᒐ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᖅᐸᖕᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᖏᖕᓕᕙᓕᑲᓂᖅᐸᑕ.